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Abstract
This thesis is composed by three independent essays on the limits of political accountability.
In the first essay I analyze an extremely stylized model of political agency with two dimen-
sional outcomes. I show that the non-contractible nature of rewards to the agent (the politician)
is especially taxing when the voters want to control outcomes in more than one dimension. I
compare and contrast this environment with traditional multitasking analyses in the context of
the theory of the firm.
The second essay examines why political accountability has failed so miserably in post-
colonial, sub-saharan Africa. I provide a theory based on the exploitation of ethnic divisions
by self-interested but weak rulers. This cleavages allow the leaders to expropriate resources
from the citizenry, included their own ethnic supporters and still remain in power. The model
predicts ethnic bias, patronage, inefficient policies and absence of public investment.
The third essay is an empirical analysis of legislative performance in the North Carolina
General Assembly. Using a new dataset I am able to show that legislators find their good
performance rewarded both within the state legislature and in their electoral careers. These
findings have relevance for the discussion on term limits and the theoretical modeling of political
agency.
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Introduction
The relationship between a politician and his constituency can be characterized as an agency
vertical relationship. This conceptualization, know as Political Agency, tries to analyze the
extent to which a politician can deviate from the wishes of the citizenry. The idea is that to the
extent that the politician values being in office and the citizen has a say in his reelection, the
citizen can strategically link his reelection decision to his perceived utility and in this fashion
force the politician to take his interestest into account, at least to some extent. In this thesis,
I examine the limits of this conceptualization of politics, looking for the crucial forces behind
some obvious breaches of political accountability.
In the first chapter, entitled "Multitask Political Agency" I start by noting that an impor-
tant difference between Political Agency analyses and traditional contract theory is that the
nature of rewards to the agent is non-contractible. This chapter shows that in a context of
multitasking, this non-contractibility makes it difficult to implement interior allocations of ef-
fort. As a consequence, the set of implementable effort vectors is not convex. Hence, in polities
where more than one dimension is salient and outcomes are complementary for the citizen,
provision of incentives is difficult and the politician is able to shirk. This result is derived
in the absence of risk-aversion or observability concerns thus adding to the understanding of
contracting difficulties in multitask environments.
The second chapter, entitled "The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics
of Fear" presents a model in which the combination of divided societies and weak institutions
in the form of "Personal Rule" regimes creates a failure of accountability of the leadership.
As a consequence, the ruler can sustain a kleptocratic regime in which he can steal from the
citizens, included his own ethnic supporters, even though he needs them to survive politically.
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The model also predicts ethnic bias, extensive use of patronage and absence of investment in
infrastructure. Hence, it fits the experience of bad governance, wasteful policies and kleptocracy
in post-colonial Africa.
The third chapter of my thesis is the result of joint work with Professor James M. Snyder. In
this piece we study an under-utilized source of data on legislative effectiveness, and exploit its
panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We find that effectiveness rises sharply
with tenure, at least for the first few terms, even after controlling for legislators' institutional
positions, party affiliation, and other factors. Effectiveness never declines with tenure, even out
to nine terms. The increase in effectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition and selective
retirement, but appears to be due to learning-by-doing. We also find evidence that a significant
amount of "positive sorting" occurs in the legislature, with highly talented legislators moving
more quickly into positions of responsibility and power. Finally, effectiveness has a positive
impact on incumbents' electoral success, and on the probability of moving to higher office.
These findings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency
advantage, seniority rule and for the theoretical modelling of political accountability.
12
Chapter 1
Multitask Political Agency
1.1 Introduction
It is very difficult to contest the assertion that the mandate of the chief executive of a country
is multidimensional. For instance, in the US, the President is responsible for economic, social
and foreign policy, and each of these dimensions involves solving many different problems.
On top of that, he is the commander in chief of the army. The citizens care about each
and every one of these dimensions, and arguably successes in them are very complementary.
Presumably, no citizen would be very happy if the economy performs extremely well but the
US is successfully invaded by Canada. What does this evident multidimensionality imply for
the political accountability of political leaders?
Starting with Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), a strand of theoretical work analyzes the
use of elections as accountability mechanisms from the point of view of agency theory. In the
simplest version of this idea, the politician acts as an agent for the citizen, who is the principal.
The agent is supposed to carry out an unobservable action that affects the payoff of the citizen.
Since the politician has different interests than the principal, the citizen needs to align their
incentives. To the extent that the politician values reelection, the citizen can tie her reelection
decision to her perceived utility thereby forcing the politician to advance the interests of her
principal.
This logic can be perfectly captured by the simplest moral hazard model. The only difference
with the typical problem from basic contract theory in the context of the firm is the nature
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of the rewards perceived by the agent. The value that a politician puts in being reelected is
extremely non-contractible. In particular, the wage politicians receive while in office is typically
below their opportunity cost in the labor market. As a consequence, their valuation of office
must come either from other pecuniary rewards beyond the control of the citizenry, such as
increased wages after their tenure in office, or some intrinsic non-pecuniary motivation 1 in the
form of honor, self-aggrandizement or willingness to contribute to the social good, which has
been referred to with the term "ego-rents". It is quite obvious that both these elements are
beyond the control of the citizenry. Indeed, starting with Ferejohn (1986), a long list of political
agency models take the valuation of office by the politician as given2. In these models the utility
of a politician in office typically depends on two elements. First, a non-contractible level that
is beyond the control of the citizenry. Second, the unobservable action the politician takes
while in office, which affects the utility of the citizen, and embeds the conflict of interests. This
conflict may take different forms. For instance, in a rent-seeking model, the politician may
try to appropriate public resources for her own benefit. On other models, producing the right
policy for the citizen needs the exertion of costly effort by the politician. Ideological shirking
in office, excess catering to special interests or acceptance of bribes in the process of policy
determination are other ways to conceptualize the conflict of interest between politicians and
citizens.
A common feature of the models referred to above is their emphasis on the informational
advantage of the politician vis-A-vis the citizen. As a consequence, the analysis is typically
restricted to one-dimensional policies3. In this paper, I extend an extremely stylized model
of political agency to two dimensions of policy. The potential outcome in each dimension is
dichotomous, so the one-dimensional problem for the citizen would be straightforward: reelect
the politician if the outcome is good, and oust her from office if it is bad. With two dimensions
'See Diermeier et al. (2004) and Groseclose and Milyo (1999).
2See, for instance Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Austen-Smith and Banks (1989), Rogoff (1990), Banks and
Sundaram (1993,1998), Besley and Case (1995), Ashworth (2003), Smart and Sturm (2004) or Snyder and Ting
(2004). Most of these papers add an adverse selection component to the underlying moral hazard. Fearon (1999)
discusses the relationship between both informational assymetries. For a stylized version of these models see
Persson and Tabellini (2000) or Besley (2004).
3An exception is Meirowitz (2003). His paper analyzes a control problem where the party in power faces a
privately known budget constraint and has different spending priorities than the citizen. In that case, the use of
mixed strategies allows the citizens to perfectly control the officeholder.
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of policy, the optimal voting rule is more complicated. It is obvious that the politician should
be reelected if both dimensions are good, and should be ousted if both are bad, but what should
the citizen do if one outcome is a success and the other a failure?
The main result of this paper can be stated as follows. In the optimal voting contract, if
the citizen wants the politician to exert effort in more than one dimension of policy, she has to
sacrifice total effort extraction. The basic intuition is simple. To increase effort provision, the
citizen has to increase ex-ante returns to effort, but since she is constrained in the total rewards
she can offer, the only way she can do so is by increasing reelection probabilities when there is a
mixed result of a success in one dimension and a failure in the other. This introduces a tension:
if a single success in one dimension is rewarded too much, the agent will concentrate effort in
this one dimension and forget the other one. But on the other hand, if only two successes are
rewarded, the agent gives up effort exertion ex-ante because marginal returns are too low. This
tension appears in two formal contexts:
First, if the citizen wants to implement an interior allocation of effort4 she has to make
sure that her voting decisions will induce a concave objective function for the problem of the
politician. In the problem of the citizen, this need appears as an extra "concavity constraint"
which puts an upper bound to the rewards to a mixed result of success in one dimension and
failure in the other. For instance, if the citizen guarantees reelection if dimension A is a success
and dimension B is a failure, the politician will for sure ignore dimension B. In other words,
to implement an interior allocation of effort there has to be substantial extra reward in having
two successes versus having only one. Since the highest reward that can be allocated is sure
reelection, single successes can only be rewarded with some positive probability of reelection,
strictly below 1. Respecting this constraint thus reduces total probability of reelection ex-ante
and, as a consequence, reduces total effort exerted. This reason for reduced effort in the interior
is thus a consequence of the second order conditions of the problem of the agent.
Second, there is a reason that works through the first order conditions. If returns to effort
are diminishing fast enough in each dimension, the politician avoids concentrating her effort in
one dimension because returns at low levels of effort are relatively high. As a consequence, the
4I denote by interior those allocations of effort in which each dimension receives strictly positive effort. On
the contrary, extreme allocations of effort are those in which the politician only exerts effort in one dimension.
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"concavity constraint" may cease to be binding because the rewards in the mixed success cases
are not necessary anymore to induce interior effort and it is enough to reward with sure reelection
in the case of two successes and eject the politician from power in any other case. However,
even in this case interior effort is reduced. The reason is that rewards in each dimension are
tied to the outcome in the other dimension. This increases the variability of rewards in each
dimension thus reducing the marginal return to effort. I call this force the "interaction effect."
These two sides of the problem of multidimensionality do not operate when the citizen wants
to implement an allocation of effort that ignores one of the issues. In such circumstance there
is no need to keep the problem concave in the two dimensions, because the reaction the voter
is aiming for is a corner solution. Moreover, to implement such allocation the citizen promises
reelection conditional on a success in just one of the dimensions and this frees the marginal
reward from the interaction effect.
Again, the main point of this paper is stated in relative terms: the incentives associated to
the electoral system fare much worse when the citizen wants to implement an interior allocation
of effort than when it is optimal to focus the politician on one issue. Hence, it is crucial to the
decision of the citizen whether the different dimensions of policy are sufficiently complementary
in her utility function. If they are complementary enough, the voter cannot live with the
knowledge that the politician is only paying attention to one issue, and as a consequence tries
to implement an interior allocation of effort. The result is a reduction of total effort exerted
by the politician because of the reasons outlined above. As a consequence, we should expect
that in countries where more than one dimension of policy are salient, politicians are able to
escape accountability. For instance, citizens from countries with latent ethnic conflicts may
put emphasis in maintaining stability in addition to promoting economic growth. This could
explain some of the cross-country correlations of ethnic fractionalization with bad economic
5outcomes.
The model presented here is related to the multitasking literature in the theory of organi-
zations, which emphasizes the difficulties of contracting in a multidimensional outcome setting.
The seminal work on multitasking agency, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), stressed that when-
ever these outcomes are observed with different degrees of accuracy by the principal, the optimal
5See Alesina and La Ferrara (2003) for a review of this literature.
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contract tends to avoid strong incentives in any of them. The mechanism behind this finding
relies on the risk aversion of the agents that makes them withdraw from tasks that are observed
more noisily and concentrate on tasks where the slope of the reward function is higher. As a
consequence, a way to encourage effort in those noisier dimensions is to reduce the incentive
associated to other dimensions, and thus weaken incentives all across the outcome space. My
model shows that this informational externality across dimensions is not present exclusively in
settings with risk averse agents. Even though both principal and agent are risk neutral in my
model, adding some observability concerns to one of the outcomes dramatically complicates
the implementation of effort in the interior. The concavity constraint affects the probability of
reelection in the two mixed cases (a success and a failure) and this links both dimensions of
effort. As a result, the deleterious effects of extra noise in one dimension spread to the other
one in a way similar to the classical multitasking literature.
Holmstr6m and Milgrom (1991) show a second reason why multitasking agency relationships
tend to feature low power of incentives: in a multidimensional setting it makes sense to think
of performance measures that are "distorted" from the real objective of the principal. This
will also be the case if the outcome in some dimension is not observable, or non-contractible.
In these circumstances, increasing incentives causes the agent to withdraw effort from other
tasks to concentrate on obtaining a better outcome along the measurable dimension. Since the
principal may want to avoid this reallocation of effort, she ends up dampening incentives. As
with risk aversion, in my model I abstract from this issue by assuming that the outcomes that
the principal observes are exactly what she cares about. Hence, neither of the known reasons
that trouble classical multitasking literature (for a paper that clarifies these two motives for
reduced incentives, see Baker (2003)) can be behind the effects that I highlight here. The
relative loss of effort in interior allocations thus comes from the assumption that the total
rewards that the agent can possibly receive are non-contractible and, as a consequence, the
agent can only play with the probability that the agent receives them. While this circumstance
is especially evident in the context of political agency, it will be important in any situation in
which the principal cannot control the total amount of rewards or she has an upper limit on
them.
Dixit (1996) presents another theory of incentives in the political arena. In his work, mul-
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tidimensionality complicates incentive provision because it is associated with the presence of a
variety of principals that care differently about the different dimensions. This common agency
setting damps incentives because the agent can play the principals against each other. In a
similar vein, Ferejohn (1986) showed that distributional concerns among the citizens will allow
the politician to escape accountability. The model that I propose here abstracts from conflicts
between principals and shows yet another reason why political agency differs from traditional
principal agent analysis: the non-contractibility of rewards is extremely taxing in multitasking
environments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model with
linear technology and solves it in detail, paying especial attention to the intuition behind the
concavity constraint and the interaction effect, and its consequences. Section III presents an
extension of the basic model in which outcome dimensions are asymmetric in their observability
and shows how interior implementation is even more complicated. The next section shows
that results are not dependent on the assumption of linear technology, and they survive the
inclusion of concavity in returns to effort. Finally, section V concludes with some discussion
on the meaning of these findings and suggests some avenues for future research. An appendix
contains the proofs to all Lemmas and Propositions stated in the text.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Environment, Timing and Definition of Equilibrium
There is a representative voter (citizen) with monotonous preferences on a two dimensional
outcome vector (a, Ob). Each dimension of the outcome vector can take two values, either
it is "good" (G) or it is "bad" (B). An elected official (politician) can exert unobservable
effort (ea, eb) that affects outcomes in the following way: The probability that Oi(outcome i) is
"good" (G) is e and the probability that it is "bad" (B) is 1 -ei, e C [0,1], i e {a, b}. Hence
each effort component only affects a single outcome dimension, and the outcome dimensions
are independent. The politician exerts effort at a cost C(ea + eb), where C(0) = 0, C' > 0,
C" > 0 and twice continuously differentiable. The politician does not care directly about the
outcome vector, but values being in office and securing reelection, which gives her an exogenous
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utility R, non-contractible. As a consequence the voter can use her voting decisions to provide
incentives to the politician by conditioning her reelection on the realization of the outcome
vector through a voting function. Assume further that both the citizen and the politician are
risk neutral and the citizen can commit ex-ante to a particular voting function. Note that for
the citizen, monotonous preferences on outcomes induce monotonous preferences on the effort
vector.
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. The citizen presents a voting function to the politician, P(Oa, Ob) : [G, B] x [G, B] -
[0,1]. This function maps the outcome space into the probability of reelection. Since
each outcome dimension is dichotomous, the function is completely characterized by four
numbers: let Pij be the probability of reelection of the politician in state (a, Ob) = (i, j).
2. The politician, upon observing the voting function decides how much effort to exert in
each dimension.
3. The outcome vector is realized and the politician is reelected with the probability stated
in the voting function for that realization. If she is reelected, she receives utility R.
The strategy of the citizen is, thus, the definition of a voting function, Pij [0, 1], i, j = G, B
that maximizes her utility given the effort level with which the politician will respond. The
strategy of the politician is a selection of effort conditional on the contract offered to her
c(PGG, PGB, PBG, PBB) : [0, 1]4 - [0, 1]2 that maximizes her probability of reelection minus
her costs of effort in each subgame. The solution concept to apply is thus subgame perfection.
There is a proper subgame for each potential voting function that the citizen may choose. The
program of the citizen is the following:
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maxeb, U(OaOb) (1.1)
e,;,eb,P(.,.)
s.t 0 < Pij < 1 i=G,B;j=G,B
0 < ek< l k=a,b
(ea, eb) argmax{R[eaebPG +ea(1-eb)PGB
+(1- ea)ebPBG + (1 - ea)(1 - eb)PBB] - C(ea + eb)} (1.2)
The last constraint (1.2) states the problem that the politician solves at each subgame.
The analysis will show that the implementation of effort allocations in the interior of the
unit square is difficult when the set of contracts available is this coarse. To clarify terms,
let "extreme allocations" denote effort vectors of the form (ea, 0), or (0, eb). Conversely, let
"interior allocations" denote any effort vectors for which ek > 0, k = a, b.
There are a number of noteworthy features of the model. Firstly, note that the citizen is
given ability to commit to a voting function. Obviously this is not a credible assumption in the
political context, but it is used, more or less explicitly in almost all studies of political agency
that only involve moral hazard concerns. If instead of a single citizen, there exist a continuum
of identical citizens then each one of them is indifferent ex-post in her decision to vote because
their probability of being pivotal is zero. Hence, they might as well vote according to the plan.
This assumption is made here for comparability of results and to isolate the consequences of
lack of contractibility in rewards. Secondly note that, as was stated in the introduction, the
citizen can make the voting function conditional exactly on the outcomes she derives utility
from. This assumption plus the risk neutrality of principal and agent separates this model from
traditional multitasking analysis.
1.2.2 Analysis: The Feasible Set
To proceed with the analysis I first consider carefully constraint (1.2). This constraint states
the problem of the agent at each subgame, given the contract she is facing. It is important to
note that the objective of the agent can be endogenously non-concave. If the citizen wants to
implement interior allocations of effort, she needs to offer a concave objective function to the
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politician. To understand the source of this endogenous non-concavity, rewrite the problem of
the agent as:
max R[eaeb(PGG-PGB-PBG+PBB)+ea(PGB-PBB)+eb(PBG-PBB)+PBB]-C(ea+eb)(ea,eb)E[0,1]2
(1.3)
Note that returns are linear in each dimension of effort, but there is an additional interaction
between ea and eb. The reason for this is a dimensionality problem: the principal cares about
the two dimensions of the outcome space, but can only reward with a one-dimensional object,
namely, the total probability of awarding reelection to the politician. As a consequence, the
marginal return to each dimension of effort is dependent on a success in the other dimension
which is what the interaction captures. The presence of this interaction places a restriction
on the set of ballot functions that the principal can use if she wants to implement an interior
allocation. The following lemma states that the interaction is crucial for the concavity of the
objective function.
Lemma 1 The objective function in (1.3) features an interior maximum in the unit square
only if
PGG -PGB -PBG + PBB > 0 (1.4)
All lemmas and propositions are proven in the appendix. The intuition is discussed here.
Let the constraint in Lemma 1 be denoted the "concavity constraint". Note that whenever
the concavity constraint holds, the interaction between efforts is multiplied by a positive co-
efficient. In this circumstance a reduction in ea reduces the marginal return to eb, and the
other way round, which makes the politician willing to move both dimensions of effort in the
same direction. On the other hand, when the concavity constraint does not hold, the politician
never wants to exert an interior effort vector. The reason is that an increase in effort in one
dimension reduces the marginal return in the other one. This gives incentives to reduce effort
in the second dimension, which increases marginal returns to the first dimension increasing its
effort further. Hence, effort in different dimensions move in different directions and therefore at
the optimum one of them must be zero. To see this, assume that the concavity constraint does
not hold and the politician is exerting an interior effort vector, Ea > 0 and b > 0. It is easy
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to show that she is better off concentrating the same total effort in the dimension that offers
better rewards. In particular, assume without loss of generality that PGB > PBG. Then
R[Eadb(PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB) + Ea(PGB - PBB) + eb(PBG - PBB) + PBB] - C(Ea + eb)
< R(ea + eb)(PGB - PBB) - C(Ea + eb)
Because
eab(PGG -PGB -PBG + PBB) <0 _< eb(PGB - PBG)
And hence the principal cannot hope to obtain an interior allocation of effort. The constraint
(1.4) can be read as an upper bound to PGB + PBG, that is, to the rewards offered when one
outcome is a success and the other is a failure. Imagine that both are 0. In this extreme case,
the politician will only earn reelection if she obtains two successes6 and, as a consequence, it is
obvious that she would exert an interior effort vector: if she did not, her marginal reward in the
dimension in which she would be putting effort would be exactly her probability of obtaining
two successes, namely 0. As PGB and/or PBG increase, returns to concentrating one's effort
increase because the prospect of leaving one outcome as a sure failure does not condemn the
politician to ejection from power. This is why the condition for concavity appears as an upper
bound to these "cross-diagonal" rewards: to obtain an interior effort vector, the principal has
to make sure that she is not rewarding mixed results (a failure in one dimension and a success
in the other) too much.
To proceed with the analysis, I separate program (1.1) in two parts. First, I trace out the
set of implementable effort vectors, that is, the set that the restrictions to the program are
defining. In other words, I find out the subgames that implement the best effort vectors in
the sense that there exist no other voting functions that can implement an effort vector that
dominates this particular one in both dimensions. Since the preferences of the principal are
monotonous in outcomes, the second step will be simply to find out which effort allocation on
the set of best implementable effort vectors suits her better. To trace this set, it is helpful to
6It will be shown immediately below that PBB = 0 and PGGcc = 1 in any optimal contract for interior effort,
as could be expected.
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separate the interior from the extremes, as the relevant constraints change. To find the set of
interior vectors one has to solve the following program, for K C (0,1):
max ea (1.5)
ea,eb,PGG ,PBB,PBG ,PGB
s.t. eb > K
0 < Pij<1 i,j=G,B
PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB > 0
R[eb(PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB) + PGB - PBB] = C'(ea + eb)
R[ea(PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB)+ PBG - PBB] = C'(e + eb)
Note that this program includes the concavity constraint necessary to implement an interior
effort vector, as well as the two first order conditions that will determine the effort level at each
dimension. Now, the following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 1 In the implementation of any optimal interior effort vector:
i. PGG = 1 and PBB = 0.
ii. The concavity constraint (1.4) is always binding.
Note that the usual individual rationality constraint is not included in the program. The
reason for this is that the politician can always guarantee herself utility RPBB by exerting no
effort at all. Moreover, the value of staying in office that the incumbent perceives is not a
transfer from the citizens and it is non-contractible. This may help clarify the intuition behind
part i. in this proposition. Since rewards are bounded above by R, the higher RPBB is, the more
difficult it is to give incentives for effort. This is why at the optimum, PBB = 0. Conversely, the
principal wants to reward the best signal she has of exertion of effort with the highest reward
she can give, because it comes at no cost to her but increases incentives for the politician. As
a consequence PGG = 1.
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To understand part ii. of proposition 1 note that low values of PGB and PBG have a first
order effect in the left hand side of the first order conditions. Keeping them low dramatically
reduces the marginal return to effort in each dimension because they are precisely the share
of the reward that is independent of a success in the other dimension. In other words, the
first order conditions ask for high values of PGB and PBG to increase total effort. Since the
concavity constraint takes the form of an upper bound to these rewards, it is always binding. As
an example, the first order conditions can be solved in closed form for the case with quadratic
costs C(el + e2) = (el + e2)2. In this case, when PGB = PBG = 0, no effort at all can be
extracted from the politician7. The reason is that even though the marginal costs are 0 when
the politician is exerting no effort, the returns also increase very slowly because they depend
exclusively on the product of the two dimensions. From the previous proposition, the set of
best implementable interior effort allocations can be identified:
Corollary 1 The set of best feasible interior effort allocations is implemented by setting PGB =
PBG = . It is constituted by the effort vectors such that
1 R= C'(ea + eb)
and e1 > 0, e2 > 0.
As it is obvious in the corollary, only the sum of efforts is determined in the frontier. In other
words, the set of best feasible interior effort allocation is a segment with negative unit slope. To
explain this, note that when the concavity constraint holds with equality, the interaction in the
objective function of the agent (1.1) disappears, leaving only the linear terms. In addition, these
linear terms have to be rewarded by the same coefficient to prevent the agent from concentrating
her effort on the dimension that offers better rewards. This implies that PGB = PBG. As a
consequence, the politician is indifferent among any vector that respects that sum, and the
principal can choose among any point in this line.
Now it is necessary to find the best extreme allocations that are implementable. To imple-
ment an extreme allocation of effort the principal does not need to worry about the concavity
7The first order conditions can be solved to obtain
_ R[PGB+PBG(R(1PGB-PBG)-1)l and e2 =R[PBG+PGB(R(1-PGB PBG)-l)]1-(R(1-PGB-PBG)-1) 2 1-(R(1-PGB-PBG)-1)2
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constraint: when the program is not concave, the absolute maximum for the agent will be for
sure in the frontier of the unit square. This makes finding the best extreme allocations very
simple:
Lemma 2 The best extreme allocation (ea, O) is obtained with PGB = 1, PBB O. Conversely,
the best extreme allocation (0, eb) is obtained with PBG = 1, PBB = 0.
The intuition is obvious: if the principal wants the agent to exert maximum ea, she does
so by ensuring that the agent will get maximum rewards whenever outcome a is "good", and
minimum rewards when it is "bad," irrespective of outcome b. Note that the implementation
of (ea, 0) is independent of PBG. The reason is that the technology in this model implies that
Pr(Oi = B/e = 0) = 1. If this event did not have probability one (if the exertion of 0 effort
did not imply a failure), then the best extreme allocation (ea, 0) would need the addition of
PGG = 1, and PBG = 0, as will be shown in the next section. The agent is risk neutral,
and hence this result has nothing to do with "insuring" the agent against superfluous risk.
The right intuition here is that making rewards contingent on outcomes that do not depend
on the effort the principal wants to implement can only make things worse8. If the principal
wants to implement only ea, 0 a is a sufficient statistic, and hence the reward to the agent
should be completely independent of Ob. As a consequence, in extreme allocations the model
behaves exactly as if it were unidimensional. The following corollary pins down the best extreme
implementable effort vector.
Corollary 2 The set of best extreme allocations is characterized by the pair of points (e*, 0)
and (0, e*) such that
R= C'(e*)
Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 fully characterize the frontier of the feasible set from which the
citizen can choose. The important result of this section is that this frontier is not continuous.
Note that along the interior frontier, when eb 0, ea - e*. Hence, there is a loss of total effort
exerted from extreme allocations to interior allocations of effort.
8See Holmstrom (1979)
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The underlying reason for this loss is the non-contractibility of R. Hence, it should be
obvious that the infinitely repeated version of this game would not solve this problem. In
particular, take the subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game that gives best payoff
to the politician and denote the value of this game for the politician. As long as < C'(1),
today's game is exactly isomorphic to the one-period game analyzed here. In particular, note
that the citizen would assign this best continuation payoff f to (a, Ob) (G, G). Therefore
the payoff in the mixed success cases has to be somewhere between 0 and f. As a consequence,
if the citizen wants to implement an interior allocation of effort, faces the same problems in the
repeated game than in the one-shot. In other words, repetition does not mitigate the relative
difficulty in implementing interior allocations of effort.
This loss implied by the discontinuity of the feasible set can be very significant. To parame-
trize this loss, it is helpful to normalize R. In particular, assume that R = C'(1). In this case,
the extreme allocations induce the politician to exert maximum effort. If it is further assumed
that costs are quadratic, it is easy to see that half the total effort is lost from the extremes to
the interior. Figure 1 shows the shape of the border of the feasible set for this case.
If the cost function is more convex than quadratic, the loss of total effort in the interior is
even bigger.
Two different reasons are behind this loss of total effort. First, in the extremes the marginal
return to the dimension of effort that the principal wants to implement is free from the inter-
ference of the other one, and hence the full power of the incentives, R, can be made to bear.
Second, there is no need to keep the problem globally concave. In other words, in the extreme,
there is no real dimensionality problem: the principal wants to implement a unidimensional
effort with a unidimensional reward function. Conversely, in the interior the marginal returns
to effort are linked, and this reduces effort. To see that the concavity constraint is not the
only reason that troubles provision of incentives in the interior, note that even if the concav-
ity constraint were not binding, the first order conditions to program (1.3) do not allow for a
symmetric (, ) allocation of effort. Examination of the closed forms of effort shows that the
best symmetric allocation that they allow is (, 1), obtained with PGB = PBG = 1. Obviously,
this contract would not respect (1.4). The need to keep the problem concave further reduces
the best feasible symmetric allocation to ( , ).
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In the linear case, the two problems are difficult to distinguish because the concavity con-
straint is always binding. In section IV, I examine a different technology that allows for cases in
which it is only the link between marginal rewards what reduces the interior maximum exertion
of effort.
The final step is to find out which point will the citizen choose in this feasible frontier. This
will depend on the degree of complementarity that the two dimensions of the outcome space
exhibit in the utility function of the voter. This complementarity is crucial because the citizen
has to choose between high effort in an extreme or low effort in the interior. Assuming that the
citizen is risk neutral, her preferences are completely described by four numbers: the utilities
that she associates to each of the four possible ex post states of the world. To normalize and
keep the problem symmetric, assume that U(GG) = 1, U(BB) = 0 and U(GB) = U(BG) = 7.
With this parametrization, y captures the degree of complementarity of the two outcomes: if
-y = 0, the outcomes are extremely complementary, because a single success does not provide
any utility to the citizen. Increasing y, hence, increases the degree of substitutability. Simple
algebra shows that whenever y > 1, the citizen prefers the politician to concentrate on only
one task because the loss of efficiency of the interior allocation is too high. The degree of
complementarity necessary to obtain an interior allocation is, thus, very high. Obviously, cost
functions more convex than quadratic would make the degree of complementarity needed even
higher, as the loss in the interior increases. Figure 2 shows the effect of -y on the shape of the
indifference curves, and hence on the optimal point chosen by the voter.
This model is easy to analyze and, as a consequence, it is a very convenient model to
specialize with simple extensions. The two reasons that cause non-convexity of the feasible set,
namely the interaction effect in the rewards function as it shows in the first order conditions
and the concavity constraint are intuitive in a world with linear technology. Nevertheless, a
close examination of the model, reveals that increasing the concavity of the returns to effort
will eventually make the concavity constraint non-binding. Hence, it is important to show that
the results presented in this section are not exclusive of the linear case, and that they survive
some degree of concavity. The parametrization that will be analyzed in section IV also covers
another concern: the fact that the cost function is defined on the sum of the efforts is no doubt
restrictive vis-A-vis linearity in the rewards function. Once we allow for nonlinearities in the
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rewards function this is not a substantive restriction anymore because extra convexity in the
cost in one dimension is equivalent to more rapidly diminishing returns in the rewards function.
1.3 Asymetric Outcome Dimensions
The assumption of symmetry of dimensions is a good simplifying device, but it clearly misses
touch with real contracting situations. Holmstr6m and Milgrom (1991) already points out the
fact that when one dimension of effort is observed more noisily than the rest, the ensuing diffi-
culty to incentivize will spread to all other tasks because the agent substitutes across dimensions
of effort searching to minimize her exposure to risk. In such a circumstance, the optimal con-
tract features lower incentive power even in the tasks that, were they performed independently,
would have been easy to control. This mechanism works through risk aversion and the trade-off
between risk and incentive provision that it induces. Since the agent is risk-neutral, this force
is absent from the framework proposed here. Nonetheless, the fact that the results in the pre-
vious section are obtained because the structure of the contract forces the interaction of both
outcomes in the rewards function, suggests that it is possible that noise in one dimension may
affect both. This section explores this possibility.
In particular, the kind of asymmetry to be examined here is the one that exists between
proactive and preventive dimensions of policy. The former can be evaluated by their results,
that most probably appear in a continuous way. On the contrary, preventive dimensions of
policy are only salient when there is an imminent threat, or a disaster has already happened.
Economic outcomes can be thought of as the usual proactive dimension, and indeed this is the
interpretation that unidimensional political agency models tend to favor. Each period, voters
can observe what the economic situation is and thus infer the effort exerted by the politician.
But the citizens ask for plenty of other things from their governments. In particular, they want
absence of disasters, or terrorist attacks, or ethnic upheaval. In these preventive dimensions,
"absence of disaster" is obviously a good outcome, but when the citizens observe this outcome
they ignore whether the disaster did not happen because the politicians exerted preventive effort
that avoided it, or simply because there was no disaster waiting to happen and the politician
(and themselves) simply were lucky. Obviously, this problem of observability makes it more
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difficult to obtain effort from the politician using reelection as incentive providing mechanism,
because the politician can always shirk and wait for the disaster not to happen by itself. The
interesting question here is whether the existence of this kind of dimensions makes it also
difficult for the citizens to control the economic performance of the politician. In other words,
I examine whether there are informational externalities across dimensions.
The environment is the same as in section II, with a slight change in technology. As
before, the probability of a good outcome in dimension a is ea, but assume now that outcome
b is observed with noise. In particular, assume that with exogenous probability 1 - , the
outcome appears as good, no matter the effort exerted by the agent in this dimension. Hence,
Pr(Ob = G) = 1 - a + aeb. The citizen commits to a voting function knowing the existence
of this imperfect observability. The agent observes the voting function and decides her effort
vector, taking into account her costs C(ea + eb) = (ea + eb)2 . The rest of the assumptions and
the definition of strategies remains unchanged.
The problem of the citizen is equal to (1.1), except in the last constraint. With the inclusion
of this asymmetry, the problem of the agent can be rewritten as:
max R[OCeaeb(1 - PGB - PBG) + ea(1 - PBG + o(PGB + PBG - 1)) + (aebPBG + PB&-.)
(ea,,eb)CE[0,1
1
2 (ea + eb)
2
As before, the analysis focusses on tracing out the border of the set of implementable effort
vectors. Note that PGG = and PBB = 0 have already been substituted into the objective
function. The reason is the same as in section II: the absence of an individual rationality
constraint plus the boundedness of possible rewards implies that in any optimal contract the
best signal of effort receives the maximum reward, while absence of success is punished with
ejection from power. The concavity constraint takes a familiar form:
Lemma 3 The objective function of the politician features an interior maximum in the unit
square only if
1 - PGB -PBG 0
The same reasoning as before applies: when the concavity constraint is not satisfied, the
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interaction between the two dimensions of effort is multiplied by a negative coefficient. In this
case the marginal reward in one dimension decreases when the effort in the other dimension
increases and, as a consequence, the maximum in the unit square has to be in the frontier. The
following proposition fully characterizes the feasible set when outcome dimensions present this
informational asymmetry:
Proposition 2 If R < 1 + a, the set of best implementable allocations contains:
i. The set of best interior allocations is characterized by the effort vectors (ea, eb) such that
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ a~1+5R = ea + eb and ea > 0, eb > O. These are reached by PBG = and PGB = 1+l+a ' i s
ii. The best extreme vector in the first dimension takes the form (e*, 0) where R = e, and is
reached by PBG = 0, and PGB = 1.
iii. The best extreme vector in the second dimension takes the form (0, e*) where cR = e,
and is reached by PBG = 1.
Several points in this proposition are worth noting. First, again, the frontier defined is not
continuous, and the set of implementable effort vectors is thus not convex. The loss of total
effort from the extremes to the interior is even more pronounced than in Section II. Note that
when the citizen wants the politician to concentrate exclusively on the task that is more easily
observable, the extreme is defined exactly as before. Hence, the maximum total effort that is
attainable is this model is exactly the same. To normalize it, use again R = 1. Obviously, the
level of eb implementable by itself is lower that the one for ea. This can be understood as the
direct effect of the extra noise: the lower a is, the more probable is that the good outcome will
appear irrespective of eb and hence the lower the marginal return to eb. The politician supposed
to concentrate on the second dimension, will, as a consequence, reduce her effort. This result is
concordant with the usual fact in moral hazard models: an increase in the noise of the measure
is replied by a reduction of effort. The difference here is that risk aversion plays no role. It is the
fixed size of the prize, R, which forces the optimal effort to contract. Note that, as - 1, the
two dimensions become more and more similar and so do the extreme efforts implementable.
In the interior, the frontier is again a segment with slope negative 1. The concavity con-
straint is saturated, which eliminates the interaction from the objective function, and hence the
30
principal has to make sure that the linear rewards for each dimension are equal if she wants
to implement an interior allocation. However, if PBG = GB, returns would not be equalized,
because effort in the second dimension is rewarded less often: again, with probability 1 - a
the outcome does not depend on eb. Moreover, since two successes are rewarded with sure
reelection, the marginal reward to ea is now higher: there is 1 - a probability that a success
in the first dimension is enough to secure reelection. Therefore, to equalize marginal returns to
effort, it is necessary that PBG > PGB. In particular, in the optimum I obtain aCPBG = PGB.
Note that again, as a -- 1 both the optimal contract and the frontier of the implementable set
converge to the solution in section II.
The results in Proposition 2 are very stark: as long as the principal decides not to implement
any eb > 0, ca plays no role. Conversely, the implementation of any vector with eb > 0, comes
at a huge cost of total effort. Note that the loss in the interior is significant even with respect
to the amount of effort implemented in the extreme where only effort in the noisy action is
implemented. The reason for this is that the requirements of the concavity constraint increase
with 1 - c as well. Even though the constraint itself does not change, the need to equalize
returns in both dimensions under PGB + PBG- 1 forces the principal to reduce the effective
reward for both dimensions. In the benchmark case of quadratic costs C(ea + eb) = (ea + eb)2,
the loss of total effort is easily quantifiable. The interior displays 1y less effort than the e*1+a ~~~~~a
extreme, and 1 less effort than the other extreme, e. More convex cost functions induce
even bigger losses of effort in the interior. Figure 3 shows the resulting feasible set.
The analysis thus reveals that, in a similar fashion as in the classical case, increased noise in
one dimension complicates the implementation of effort in other dimensions. The relative loss
of effort with respect to the case in which only the perfectly observable effort is exerted is now
much bigger in the interior. As a consequence, a huge degree of complementarity is needed for
the principal to want to implement anything interior. On the other hand, if a bad Ob is really a
disaster such as a foreign invasion, this degree of complementarity may be realistic. Note that,
in any case, the non-convexity of the feasible set will most probably call for corner solutions.
An implication of this is that two countries with the same underlying utility function for their
citizens and slight differences in a could provide extremely different incentives to their leaders.
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1.4 The Role of Concavity
To examine the robustness of the results in previous sections, this one analyzes a slightly
generalized version of the linear model. In previous sections, the concavity constraint was
always binding when the citizen was implementing an interior allocation of effort. However,
if returns to effort are concave enough, diminishing returns may suffice to induce an interior
allocation irrespective of the voting function that is offered. Nonetheless, as was underlined in
section II, there is another reason that complicates the implementation of interior effort vectors,
namely the link that marginal returns have due to the lack of dimensionality in the rewards.
By adding diminishing returns, these two effects can be analyzed separately, because for some
levels of concavity, the concavity constraint is not binding but yet interior allocations are worse
than extreme ones in terms of total effort.
The environment is the same as in section II. The only change is in the technology that
maps effort into probability of success. Assume now that the probability that Oi(outcome i)
is "good" (G) is e, where e R+, and the probability that it is "bad" (B) is 1 - e. The
politician exerts effort at a cost C(ea + eb) = (ea -+- eb)2. Obviously, ei [0,1] i = a,b.
As before, the voter can use her voting decisions to provide incentives to the politician by
conditioning her reelection on the realization of the outcome vector through a voting function
P(0 1 , 02): [G, B] x [G, B] - [0, 1]. Again, since the politician can always secure utility 0 for
herself, it can be stated that PGG = 1 and PBB = 0 in any optimal voting function. As before,
the citizen and the politician are risk neutral and the citizen can commit ex-ante to a particular
voting function. Timing and definition of strategies do not change from section II.
Note that the model with quadratic costs in section II is a particular case of this one with
3 = 1. With this parametrization, 6 captures the degree of diminishing returns to effort. Lower
3 means that the transformation from levels of effort to probabilities of success becomes worse
and worse as the level of effort increases in that dimension.
The program of the principal is analogous to (1.1), but obviously the objective function of
the agent in the last constraint features a different technology. The problem of the agent in
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each subgame is now:
max R[e6e + e(1 - e)PGB + (1 - ea)ePBG] - (ea + eb) (1.7)
(ea ,eb)E[0,1]2 a
As before, the analysis concentrates in tracing out the set of implementable effort vectors.
In particular, I will limit the analysis to compare the total effort that can be extracted from the
politician in extreme allocations with the total effort that she will exert in the best symmetric
allocation of effort. This is made for expositional simplicity because it gives tighter intuition
while reducing the number of parameters and variables to control. To do this comparison, the
following lemma characterizes the best extreme implementable vectors.
Lemma 4 The set of best feasible extreme vectors is characterized by the pair of points (e*, 0)
and (0, e*) such that
e* = 2-
Hence, to normalize these points to (1,0) and (0,1), it is necessary to set R = . The
faster diminishing returns set in, the higher has to be the reward in order to normalize effort
to 1, because the marginal return to effort at high levels is lower. As a consequence, since
lower implies faster diminishing returns, normalized rewards have to increase as 6 decreases.
Having normalized R, the discussion about the best symmetric effort vector is clarified: if the
vector (, ) can be implemented, there is no loss of total effort. The following proposition
identifies the best symmetric effort allocation as a function of J. Since symmetric allocations
are implemented by symmetric voting functions, let P = PGB = PBG.
Proposition 3 The best implementable symmetric effort vector (e, e) as function of 6 is:
i. If 6 > , the concavity constraint is binding and e is defined implicitly by e2-2[4 - 2(1 -
15)] = 6. It is implemented by P
ii. If 6 < , the concavity constraint is not binding, and e is defined by e ()2-26. It is
implemented by P= 0
Several points in the previous proposition are worth emphasizing. First, note that quite
naturally, the concavity constraint becomes less and less restrictive the more important are
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6 P
2 X'2 3
3 4 4
.7 .349 .728
.9 .298 .587
1 1 1
1.1 .171 .472
Table 1.1: Effort and Optimal Contract
diminishing returns. The reason has been hinted at before: if returns to a dimension of effort
are diminishing, this by itself gives an incentive to the politician not to concentrate effort.
Hence with diminishing returns it is easier for the voter to implement interior allocations of
effort. In part i. where the constraint is binding, this effect is evident because higher 6 implies a
more restrictive upper bound to PGB and PBG and, as a consequence, the exertion of less effort
in the interior. The reason why the constraint is binding is that returns to effort at low levels
are too low, and hence the power of the incentives has to be high to incentivize any exertion of
effort. The only way that the citizen has to increase the power of the incentives is increasing
PGB and PBG, as the first order conditions recommend, and this makes sure that the concavity
constraint will be hit.
Table 1 presents values of optimal symmetric e and P, for some values of 6 > . Again,
both and P are decreasing in because the concavity constraint becomes more and more
stringent. Note that for = 1, that is, for the linear case, the result obtained is exactly the
same as in the previous section: half of total effort is lost in the interior with respect to extreme
allocations. Hence, the results obtained in the simple linear model are not dependent on the
assumption of linearity: there is a neighborhood of continuous functions around linearity for
which the concavity constraint of the program will be binding and hence it will drive directly
how much interior effort the principal can extract from the agent using reelection incentives.
According to part ii. in the proposition, when 6 < , the constraint is not binding anymore.
This comes from the fact that the force of diminishing returns is enough to keep the effort
allocation in the interior. Moreover, as the proposition states, in this cases the best way to
increase effort is to punish with ejection from power any outcome that is not a success in both
dimensions. The reason for this is that the good side of this high level of concavity is that
returns are very high at low levels of effort, and hence total probability of reelection, even if it
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only happens with two successes, is enough to motivate effort. Recall that in the linear case,
the effort in response to such incentive system was 0.
Proposition 3 shows that the interaction effect in the first order conditions can cause a
loss in total effort in the interior even when the concavity constraint is not a problem. The
fact that when deciding how much effort to put in one dimension, returns are conditional on a
success in the other dimension reduces the marginal reward at all levels and, as a consequence,
total effort with respect to the extreme. Observe that, according to the solution for e in this
case, e < 1. for > . Hence there is a range < 6 < in which even though the concavity
constraint is not binding, the principal cannot implement a symmetric allocation in which the
politician exerts the same total effort than in the extreme. When < 1, returns to effort are2'
so rapidly diminishing that the interior allocation beats the extreme, overcoming the effect of
the interaction in the first order conditions.
The effect of the interaction between dimensions is actually very strong. To see this, ignore
the interacting term. In this case, the agent would be actually solving
max R[eP + eP]- 1 (e + eb)2(ea,eb)G[0,1?2 a 
It is obvious that the solution of this program with diminishing returns, that is, for 6 < 1 is
interior and symmetric. Since the cost is defined on the sum of efforts and there are diminishing
returns to each effort dimension, the optimal reaction is to avoid concentration. Hence for any
6 < 1 the citizen would have no problem implementing an interior allocation. It is the presence
of the interaction across effort dimensions which complicates keeping the objective function
concave. As a consequence it cannot construct a reward system in which the interior is better
than the extremes unless the pace of diminishing returns is very fast, < . The reason for the
presence of this interaction is the different dimensionality of the objective of the citizen and the
politician: the citizen cares differently about each dimension with potential complementarities,
but the objective of the politician is unidimensional: maximize the probability of reelection.
Note that optimal P exhibits a bang-bang behavior in this non-linear model. The effect of
P is to reduce rewards associated to the interaction and to increase those in the independent
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terms 9. When rewards at low levels of effort are small, that is, when is high, the optimal
strategy is actually to increase P as high as possible because the probability of success in each
dimension is small, and hence the probability of two successes is too small to incentivize any
effort by itself. As a consequence optimal P rises as much as the concavity constraint allows. On
the other hand, when returns at low levels of effort are high, the optimal contract emphasizes
returns at the interaction because this is the best way to induce interior allocations of effort in
any case, and the product is now high enough to obtain positive effort by itself.
Hence, even though diminishing returns in the mapping from effort to probabilities will
eventually eliminate the problem, the fact that inducing interior levels of effort is difficult with
this type of contracts is by no means exclusive of the linear case. In each particular application
of this rewards system it will be up to discussion whether the production functions are concave
enough, but in general, it has been shown that a very high degree of concavity ( < ) is
necessary for the principal to be able to implement higher total effort in the symmetric interior
than in the extremes. For intermediate values ( < < ), the concavity constraint is not
binding yet, but the symmetric allocation is more and more costly in terms of total effort.
Finally, for > 2, and including, obviously, linearity and all convex functions, the concavity3,
constraint is binding and driving the level of effort implementable in the interior.
1.5 Conclusion
This analysis of multitask political agency suggests that the electoral system is not a very
useful tool to provide incentives in a context of multidimensional mandates, which is the case
for virtually all elected offices. Elections are too blunt an instrument to provide incentives
conducing to attention to each dimension of policy. As a consequence, narrowing the set of
functions that fall under an elected officer's responsibility should help holding him accountable.
The attribution of clear objectives on inflation to independent central bankers or the existence
of independently elected school boards in the US can be interpreted in this way. In other
contexts where the reward systems provide the same kind of contractual environment, such as
in bureaucracies, attributions tend to be narrow in scope.
9The objective function of the agent can be rewritten as R[eae'(1 - 2P) + e P + eP] - (ea + eb)
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To the extent that the results presented here are applicable, the analysis suggests that a
polity where more than one dimension is salient will face difficulties when trying to implement
an interior allocation of effort from the politician. As a consequence the model gives a rationale
for corner solutions: unless issues are very complementary, citizens achieve a higher level of
utility by forcing their politicians to focus on one issue at a time. It is important to consider
what is the relevant interpretation of "issues" in this kind of models. The assumption of a
single principal directs the attention to dimensions of the policy space where there is no conflict
among citizens, and they can all agree on what is "good". This is probably why the economic
dimension, or absence of corruption, tends to be favored in the literature: a huge majority of
the population of a country must agree that stable economic growth is better than stagflation.
10It obviously cannot be used to assess control along a redistributive policy dimension
This last point may provide an additional reason for why deeply divided societies tend to
have bad economic outcomes and non-performing leaders in the economic dimension. Bates
(1983) and Horowitz (1985) among others argue that ethnic conflict is fought to control the
central government, or to avoid the ethnic antagonists controlling it. The consequence of such
a struggle may be that whenever an ethnic group controls a given government, the mandate
from this group to its leaders is, at least, strongly two dimensional. As before, every citizen of
every country prefers economic growth to economic stagnation, but additionally an empowered
ethnic group in a severely divided country wants its government to exert effort in the task of
maintaining their position vis-A-vis rival groups. These efforts may be strongly detrimental to
the economic performance of the country, but the mechanism highlighted here shows that even
if this were not the case, the existence of such a strong second dimension may relax completely
the incentives that the leader faces to exert any effort in the economic dimension: any interior
allocation may be so costly to sustain in terms of total effort that the citizenry may give up and
force the politician to concentrate completely on maintaining the status quo, especially if the
threat of losing power is difficult to observe, as in section IV, and it is perceived as a potential
disaster for the empowered group. Note that in this case, such a country would be economically
underperforming even in the absence of actual fighting among groups. In this model, the worse
'°Ferejohn (1986) already noted that the possibility of control of a politician that uses redistributive tools is
very difficult.
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situation a citizen can face is a government in a country where the economic dimension has
to compete with a more pressing dimension that has worse observability characteristics. The
choices of the citizen are between little effort in keeping the status quo, and lots of economic
effort that will do no good to her if the position of power is lost. Padr6-i-Miquel (2004) exploits
this logic in a model where the leader can divert resources to explain the stability of kleptocratic
regimes in divides societies.
The effort presented here is a first trial at the implications of multidimensionality on po-
litical agency. Other related avenues of research remain untouched. In particular, it would be
interesting to study the selection problem in a context where one politician can promise rela-
tively better performance in a particular dimension than the other candidate. If the saliency
of issues is stochastic, this program could add insight on government turnover not dependent
on actual performance but on perception of the state of the world. In addition, it has been
assumed that the two dimensions of effort and outcomes are independent of each other. This
assumption is not extreme in the sense that one can think of cases where good outcomes in the
two dimensions are positively or negatively correlated. Nonetheless some additional insights
could be gained in future research by relaxing this assumption.
38
1.6 Appendix
Proof to Lemma 1:
The first order conditions of problem (1.3) yield:
R[eb(PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB) + PGB - PBB] - C'(ea + eb) = 0
R[ea(PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB)+ PBG - PBB] - C'(ea + eb) = 0
Hence, the Hessian of the program is:
-C(ea + R(PGG - PGB - PBG PBB) - C"(ea + eb)
V R(PGG-- PGB - PBG + PBB) - C"(ea + eb) -C" (ea + eb)
And the determinant of the Hessian:
-R 2 (PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB)2 + 2R(PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB)C"(ea + eb)
Which is negative whenever PGG-PGB-PBG+PBB < 0. In this case the matrix is indefinite,
the first order conditions define a saddle point and the global maxima of the function has to
be in an corner of the unit square. If PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB > 0, for C"(ea + eb)/R high
enough, the determinant is positive and the Hessian is negative definite. Hence the program is
concave and the first order conditions define a global maximum.
Proof to Proposition 1:
Ignore for the moment restrictions POG > , PBB < 1 and 0 < PGB, PBG < 1. State
program (1.5)as follows:
max ea
ea ,eb,PCG ,PBB,PBG,PGB
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s.t. ea
1 - PGG
PBB
PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB
R[eb(PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB) + PGB - PBB]
R[ea(PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB) + PBG - PBB]
> K
> 0
> 0
> 0
= C'(ea + eb)
= C'(ea+eb)
The first order conditions of the lagrangian yield:
- + 6 + R(,ea + eb)
lr + + R(A(eb- 1) + I(ea- 1))
-6 + R(-Aeb + /(1 - ea))
-6+ R(A(1 - eb) - pea)
1 - AC"(ea + eb) + [R(PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB) - C"(ea + eb)]
v - aC"(ea + eb) + A[R(PGG - PGB - PBG + PBB) - C"(ea + eb)]
= 0 (1.8)
-= 0 (1.9)
= 0 (1.10)
= 0 (1.11)
= 0 (1.12)
= 0 (1.13)
Note that the multipliers are stated so that they are weakly positive. Moreover, the mul-
tipliers associated to the equality constraints have to be strictly positive. Hence, (1.8) implies
that > 0, and as a consequence PGG = 1. Now assume that ir = 0. Under this assumption,
(1.9) and (1.11) imply -,u = 0, which is not possible. As a consequence, 7r > 0 and PBB = 0.
Equations (1.10) and (1.11) imply that A = u. But then equation (1.10) can be rewritten
as -6 + R/(1 - ea- eb) = 0. As a consequence, 6 > 0 unless ea + eb = 1, but this is not possible
in the interior because the first order conditions do not allow for it as long as R < 2C'(1), that
is, whenever rewards are small so that the moral hazard problem is significant. Hence 6 > 0
which implies that the concavity constraint is binding.
Note that these conclusions imply that PGG > 0 and PBB < 1. The concavity constraint is
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[I]
[~]
[r]
[6]
[A]
[P]
rewritten as PGB + PBG = 1, hence these two parameters are interior. The restrictions ignored
at the beginning are, thus, satisfied.
Proof to Lemma 2:
Assume eb = 0. Given this, the agent is maximizing Rea(PGB - PBB) - C(ea). The first
order condition yields R(PGB - PBB) = C'(e*). Since C(.) is convex, e is a global maximum.
Moreover, the maximum e* is increasing in PGB and decreasing in PBB. Hence the best extreme
vector is obtained with PGB = 1 and PBB = 0.
Now it is needed to verify that eb = 0 when PGB = 1 and PBB = 0. If PBG > 0 the
concavity constraint is not satisfied, and the maximum has to be in a corner. But as long as
PBG < 1 = PGB, the politician concentrates effort in ea, thus eb = 0. If PBG = 1 = PGB, then
the politician is indifferent between both corners. Finally, if PBG = 0 the first order condition
predicts a negative eb. Hence, eb = 0.
The proof for the other extreme vector follows exactly the same steps.
Proof to Lemma 3:
Follow the steps in the proof to Lemma 1.
Proof to Proposition 2:
Assume first that the concavity constraint is saturated. If this is the case, the first order
conditions to (1.6) reduce to:
R(l - PBG + (PGB + PBG - 1)) = ea + eb
RaPBG = ea + eb
Since for an interior solution both first order conditions have to hold, the best interior effort
vectors when the concavity constraint binds are implemented by:
R(l- PB + (PGB + PBG - 1) = RPBG
PGB + PB = 1
Which solve to PGB = and PBG = . Substitution into the first order conditionsl~--a l+a'
41
yields ea + eb = -- R. Now it is needed to show that no allocation with PGB + PBG < 1 can
do better. To see this, take first order conditions of (1.6) and, since they are linear in ea and
eb, solve them. This yields:
R(1 - PBG + a(PBG + PGB - 1) + aPBG(aR(1 - PBG - PGB)- 1)) (1.14)
~~~ea 1- (Ra(1 - PBG - PGB) - 1)2
R(aPBG +[1 - PBG + a(PBG + PGB - 1)](aR(1 - PBG - PGB) - 1)) (1.15
eb ~ = ~1 - (Ra(1 - PBG - PGB) - 1)2
Now check under which conditions ea + eb> R with PGB PBG < and a > 0, eb > 1+-
Using the previous formulae and some simplification:
R[1 - PBG + &(PBG + PGB - 1) + aPBG]
a eb =2 - Ra(1 - PBG- PGB)
Now, let S = PGB + PBG. The condition ea + eb > 1-R reduces to:
1 - PBG + a(S - 1)+ aPBG > a
2- Ra(1 - S) 1+ a
1 - a + a(1 - S)[Ra - 1 - a]
PBG < (1 +a)(1- a)
On the other hand, it is needed to ensure that eb > 0. Since the denominator in (1.15) is
positive when PGB + PBG < 1, it is enough to set the numerator positive. Hence:
aPBG + [1 - PBG + a(S- 1)](aR(1 - S)- 1) > 0
PBG 1 - a(1 - S)[R + 1] + Ra 2 (1- S)2
a + 1- Ra(1- S)
Hence, for these two conditions to hold at the same time:
1 - a + a(1 - S)[Ra- 1 - a] 1- a(1 - S)[R + 1]+ R 2(1 - S)2
(1 + a)(1 - ) a + 1 - Ra(1 - S)
Some algebra reduces this expression to:
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2(R- 1 -a) + (1 - S)aR(a + 1 - R) > 0
Now, if R < 1 + a, this condition can be rewritten as:
2
1-S> _ > 1
aeR-
Which is obviously not possible because requires it S < 0. Hence, in any optimal voting
function to implement interior effort vectors, the concavity constraint must be binding.
For the extreme cases, assume first that eb = 0. Then the first order condition of (1.6)
yields:
ea = R(1 - PBG + oa(PGB + PBG - 1)) = R(1 - c -+ aPGB - (1 - )PBG)
Hence, the best ea is obtained by PGB = 1 and PBG = 0, which yields ea = R. From
equation (1.15), it is clear that this ballot function induces negative eb, hence the optimal
solution is at the corner eb = 0.
For the other extreme case, assume now that ea = 0. Now the first order condition of (1.6)
yields:
eb RPBG
Hence the best eb is obtained by PBG = 1. Now if PGB > 0, the concavity constraint is
not satisfied and hence the solution is in a corner. It is very easy to check that for 1 > PGB
returns to eb are higher than to ea and hence the solution must feature ea = 0. If PGB = 1
then returns are equal and hence the politician is indifferent between both extremes. Finally if
PGB = 0 it is easy to check from (1.14) that this ballot function induces negative ea, hence the
optimal solution is at the corner ea = 0.
Proof to Lemma 4:
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The first order conditions of program (1.7) yield:
Re'a [PGB + e(1 - PGB - PBG)] - ea - eb = 0 (1.16)
R6e [PB e(1 - PGB PBG)] -ea - eb 0 (117)
l~6e~-l~~~p~c -]- ea ...... 2 -
Assume that eb = 0. Then, from (1.16), ea = (R6PGB) 7- ~. Hence, PGB = 1. Normalizing
R = ~, it is easy to check that (1.17) implies negative eb. Hence eb = 0, at the corner. The
proof for the other extreme is analogous.
Proof to Proposition 3:
(1.16) and (1.17) imply that whenever ea = eb = e, PGB = PBG = P. Hence a single first
order condition remains, and can be rewritten as:
P + e(1 - 2P) -2e 2- = 0
The determinant of the Hessian of (1.7), substituting in ea = eb = e and PGB = PBG = P,
is positive whenever:
(6 - 1)e6 -2 [P + e6(1 - 2P)] < e2 (- 1)(1 - 2P)
This concavity constraint can be rewritten as:
(1 - )e-6 P + 1 - 2P > 0
Hence, the program to find the point at which the feasible set crosses the 45° degree line is
the following:
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max eP,e
s.t. P + e'(1 - 2P)-2e 2- 6 = 0 [A]
p > o[0]
1-p > 0 []
(1-6)e - 'P+1-2P > 0 [y]
For now, assume that the third restriction is never binding. It will be shown later that this
is the case. The first order conditions for this program yield:
1 + (5e 6 -1 (1 - 2P) - 2(2 - 6)el-)A - 6(1 - )e-6-Py = 0
(1-2e 6)A + p+y((1-6)e -2) = 0 (1.18)
Assuming for now that (1 - )e - - 2 < 0, as will be shown below, (1.18) implies that
whenever 1 - 2e3 < 0, > 0, because the program is set so that the Lagrange multipliers are
weakly positive. For the same reason, whenever - 2e > 0, 7 > 0. Hence, there are two
regimes:
* When 1 - 2e 6 < 0, P = 0, which substituted into the first restriction (foc), yields
1 e = (2) 2-2. (1.19)
* When 1- 2e6 > 0, the first and the fourth constraints are binding. Solving for P in both
of them and equalizing yields an implicit expression for e:
e2-25[4e - 2(1 - 6)] = 6 (1.20)
The value of P is P = 2_(1)e_ , simply a rewriting of the fourth constraint.
To find the level of at which the regime switches, it suffices to plug (1.19) into (1.20) and
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solve for it:
-[4( ) 2- - 2(1 - )] > 522
<2
3
Two details were left above. It remains to be shown that (1 - )e- 6 - 2 < 0. When < ,
using (1.19) one obtains e-d = 22-2 < 2, whenever < . As a consequence, since 1 -6 < in
this case, the expression is trivially true. On the other hand, when > , one can use (1.20): e
and 6 are positive, hence it must be the case that 4e - 2(1 -6) > 0. But this expression directly
implies what was needed to show. Moreover, it remained to be shown that the restriction P < 1
is never binding, but this is obvious from the results obtained.
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Chapter 2
The Control of Politicians in Divided
Societies: The Politics of Fear
2.1 Introduction
"Very quickly, African independence and socialism turned into one-man dictator-
ships, characterized by conspicuous consumption by the elites and a "Swiss-bank
socialism" that allowed the head of state and his cohort of vampire elites to loot
their countries' treasuries (...). Billions of dollars were deposited abroad by the Ba-
bangidas, the Bandas, the Barres, the Does, the Kerekous, the Houphouet-Boignies,
the Mois, the Mobutus, the Mengistus and many others."'
The plundering of African economies has been a systematic and generalized practice of
African leaders in the years since their countries achieved independence. The private rewards
from such activities have been enormous: several rulers, such as Mobutu, Moi or Houphouet-
Boigny, have been estimated to have personal fortunes equivalent to the total external debt
accumulated by their countries2. Accompanying the blatant enrichment of the leadership, there
has been an effort to engage in extensive redistribution of resources in surprisingly inefficient
ways. For instance, revenue is raised through costly market manipulations such as oligopolistic
'Quote from Ayittey (1992:105)
2 See Ayittey (1992) or Mbaku (2000) for an account of the extend of thievery.
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Marketing Boards for agricultural produce, financial repression and manipulations of the for-
eign exchange rate. Bloated and inoperant bureaucracies consume a huge share of these public
resources and are used as distribution channels for patronage. Excessive and inefficient regula-
tion and redistribution, bureaucratic corruption and outright stealing by the leadership explain
a large share of the dismal economic performance of African economies in the last five decades3 .
Despite such record, the political longevity of kleptocratic and inefficient rulers is remarkable.
For instance, Kenya endured Moi's leadership for 24 years, and Houphouet-Boigny's leadership
of Ivory Coast ended with his death, after 33 years in power.
From the point of view of the literature on Political Accountability4 these facts are puzzling.
As long as citizens retain the ability to replace the leader, their interests should be taken into
account in the formulation of policies, at least to some extent. Nonetheless, the reality in Africa
suggests that this mechanism dramatically fails to work. What explains the incapacity of the
citizenry to constrain such blatantly venal leaders?
Obviously, whenever the political survival of the ruler does not depend at all on the acquies-
cence of the citizenry, political accountability will be absent. Hence, an immediate explanation
for the situation in Africa is that coercion and force are used to crush any potential dissent
and to keep power. However, African states -colonial, and post-colonial alike- are generally
portrayed as very weak states, with limited control over their territories, with weak armies and
police forces5 and severely limited bureaucracies. This is difficult to reconcile with the idea that
such regimes have been able to keep their populations from expressing their discontent at the
enrichment of the few and the poverty of the many solely through the use of violence. Moreover
casual empiricism suggests that the most successful kleptocratic regimes, such as Zaire, Kenya
or Gabon typically did not resort to their armies to maintain stability.
Instead, a better explanation is that these leaders have been able to co-opt large shares
3 For the effect of bad policies, see Collier and Gunning (1999), Easterly and Levine (1997) or Easterly (2002).
For the effect of political and bureaucratic corruption see, for instance, Mbaku (2000).
4 The seminal theoretical work on these lines is Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). In these models the
politician is portrayed as an agent of a representative citizen. The leader can shirk to the extent that she enjoys
some informational advantage, but the citizen places limits on this potential shirking by replacing the ruler when
the outcomes are bad.
5La Ferrara and Bates (2001) characterize underdeveloped polities by absence of monopoly over the use of
violence. For a classical exposition of the characteristics of weak states, see Migdal (1988). See also Herbst
(2000), Bates (2001) and Cooper (1999) for a longer discussion on their historical roots.
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of their populations into supporting the regime6. The patterns of inefficient redistribution
can thus be rationalized by the need to obtain support from sizable groups. However, this
explanation opens a new set of questions: how is it possible that these leaders were able to
amass such exorbitant personal wealth at the same time that they were rewarding a share of
their populations sufficiently large to maintain power? Even more intriguing, if the authority
of the ruler is cemented by the support of a particular group, how is it possible that internal
competition within the group has not dissipated, at least to some extent, the enormous rents
that these leaders were accumulating?
This paper develops an argument that explains the absence of accountability together with
the policy patterns observed in Africa. The proposed model adds two elements to the par-
adigmatic political accountability framework: first, the presence of politically relevant ethnic
divisions, and second, the characterization of African polities as "Personal Rule" 7 regimes, a
particular type of "weakly institutionalized" political systems.
Ethnic groups feature two characteristics that are essential for the argument presented
here. Firstly, as developed extensively in Bates (1983)9, in Africa ethnics groups are the result
of competition for the spoils of modernization, and, as a consequence, they serve as exclusion
devices. This means that it is very difficult for an individual to change his ethnic definition or
allegiance, especially if it is to join the group of "winners." This phenomenon creates intraethnic
loyalty because in the short to medium term, the fate of each individual is linked to the fate
of the group. This constrain is true both for the rank-and-file and the elite members of an
ethnic group. Secondly, as a consequence of this last point, ethnic links provide a two-way
commitment device. The ruler can commit to provide patronage to his ethnic supporters in the
future, and supporters can commit to support their leader10. Moreover, since the strength of
personal links inside the group is stronger than across groups, deviations are easier to punish
if the group is responsible for it11, making intra-group cooperation easier to sustain.
It is suprising to see many instances were large populations are easily mobilized by the regime: ethnic voting
is such an example, but the much darker side of it was present in Rwanda, in 1994.
7See Jackson and Rosberg (1982) for a characterization of such regimes.
8See Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004).
9 Also, see Horowitz (1985).
l°For other instances of ethnic groups as commitment devices see Bates (2000).
l See Fearon and Laitin (1996) and Miguel and Gugerty (2004) for different arguments based on ethnic groups
enhancing the capacity to punish deviations by group members.
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In a system of Personal Rule, the power of the leader is not bound by the attributions of her
office but by her personal power cemented in clientelist links. The personal nature of these links
makes the stability of the regime contingent on the identity of the ruler. As a consequence, the
process of replacing a leader in power is not controlled by an established political institution,
and hence it is uncertain and hardly ever smooth. Jackson and Rosberg (1982), write "a
succession [...] alters at least some of the important relationships and standings among leaders
and factions- for example, the standing of big men and the clan and ethnic communities they
represent" and "The ultimate uncertainty in a system of personal rule lies in the key point of
vulnerability: the ruler. [...] If he falls, his relatives, friends, lieutenants, clients and followers
also may fall, and the ensuing political disruption may threaten the political peace." Thus,
ousting a leader may initiate a process that involves a potential change in the relative status
of different groups in society. The cases of Kenya or Cameroon are good examples of dramatic
switches in the standing of different ethnic groups caused by succession.
Ethnic divisions and weak institutions are key for the mechanism that I present. The ruling
leader needs the support of her ethnic group to maintain power, because the other ethnic groups
prefer their own leaders in equilibrium. To keep the support from her group, the leader has to
make sure that her supporters are better off under her rule than under the rule of a leader from
another group. However, this is a relative statement because no leader cannot commit not to
heavily expropriate the groups she does not belong to. As a consequence, any leader is able
to steal from her own kinsmen because they would be even worse off under the leadership of
another ethnic group. Supporters are forced to defend the regime because the only way to check
their own ruler is to replace her, but in a context of Personal Rule this increases the probability
of an ethnic turnover in power, and with it the probability of falling in the excluded status with
increased expropriation. This is what I call the Politics of Fear: The worse is your expected
situation under a ruler from another group, the more you will allow the ruler from your group
to misbehave before withdrawing your support. This threat of domination allows the ruler to
expropriate resources even from her own basis of support thus explaining the ability of African
leaders to amass such amounts of personal wealth.
This logic of exclusion provides a rationale for the inefficient use of public funds as resources
for patronage to the ruler's ethnic group. For this result, an additional assumption needs to be
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considered: assume that it is easier to target supporters' income with patronage expenditures
than it is with taxation or other means of raising revenue. With this addition, the mechanism
works as follows. To the extent that each group's income cannot be targeted specifically by
taxation (if taxation is indirect, a group can escape a high rate of taxation by changing its
economic activity), the ruler is forced to raise taxation rates across the board if she wants
to increase the amount of funds at her reach. To prevent this increase from alienating her
supporters, she needs to hand back targeted patronage to her group so that they keep supporting
her. Since patronage is only received by a fraction of the population, but allows an increase of
taxation to all groups in society, patronage will be overprovided in equilibrium. This outcome is
thus consistent both with the coexistence of heavy rates of taxation and inefficient subsidization
to supporter groups observed in Africa and with the prevalence of "pork-barrel" politics in
ethnically divided societies.
Moreover, to the extent that different ethnic groups devote their efforts to different activi-
ties12 and there exist economic rigidities in their choice of activity, the ruler can use discrimina-
tory taxation against the excluded group. Increased taxation on the activities of the excluded
group will not be met by an immediate abandonment of such activities precisely because that
group has a comparative advantage in them. In other words, the more a group's source of wealth
is sector specific, the less they can arbitrage differences in taxation across sectors. Hence, an
economy based in long term cash crop exports such as cocoa or coffee, which involve long-term
specific planted capital, will exhibit more venal leaders. The same holds for an economy richer
in natural resources. This helps explain the natural resource curse of countries such as Nigeria,
or the venality of Kenya's leaders.
With the three assumptions considered together, the amount the leader is able to divert
is endogenous to the model because both the gains from replacing her (avoiding her current
stealing) and the costs (the increased probability of a ruler from the current opposition ethnic
group) are determined in equilibrium by the strategies played by rulers and potential substitutes.
This theory uncovers a mechanism of "amplification of kleptocracy": current supporters will
accept more stealing from their leader the bigger is the difference between their payoff under
12That there is stratification in economic activities across ethnic groups has been long noticed. "Cementing
the ethnic division of labor is the preeminent role of ascriptive ties in economic relations in the developing world"
in Horowitz (1985).
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the current ruler and the payoff under a potential ruler from the opposition group. The more
they could lose in the future (i.e. the bigger is the gap), the more their own ruler can steal from
them today. This fear is greater the more the potential substitute from the opposition is able to
steal in equilibrium. As a consequence, any characteristic of the economy that allows one type
of ruler to expropriate (for instance, because the income of her group is very activity-specific),
will allow any type of ruler to misbehave.
Finally, the equilibrium amount of stealing is decreasing in the quality of institutions. In
particular, the more the probability of a group staying in power depends on the personal links
of the incumbent, the more her supporters are afraid of holding her accountable and hence
the heavier the burden of expropriation that they will accept. On the contrary, institutions
that make the capture of government by a particular group more difficult, reduce personal
dependence of political stability or limit the capacity to target taxation and patronage will
reduce kleptocratic excesses.
The implications of the model are thus consistent with an array of cross-country empiri-
cal literature that concludes that ethnic fractionalization is associated with poverty and lost
opportunities for growth13. It results from these analyses that the main cause to link ethnic
divisions to bad economic outcomes seems to be different dimensions of bad policy. A panoply
of papers 14 highlight the association of high levels of ethnic fractionalization with low provision
of public goods such as infrastructure and publicly provided private goods such as schooling
or health services. The picture is not only one of bad policies, but one of bad governance:
ethnic fractionalization correlates positively with the presence of corruption and "pork barrel
politics" 15. A final stylized fact is that the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and nega-
tive economic outcomes is diluted at high levels of institutional development'6. In other words,
13This literature originates with Mauro (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1997), both papers using the same
data to approximate ethnic divisions. The correlation of ethnic fractionalization with low levels of growth survives
the use of alternative measures of ethnic divisions, as Alesina et al. (2003) show. This correlation is robust to the
use of alternative summary indexes of diversity, such as polarization as in Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal Querol
(2002).
14See Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (1999),(2003) among others.
l5For the negative relationship of ethnic fractionalization with different indicators of civil liberties, electoral
rights and democratic politics see Barro (1999) and Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004). Mauro (1995), Alesina
et. al (2003) among others show the positive relationship between fractionalization and different measures of
corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and absence of rule of law.
16See Collier (2000), Easterly (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2003).
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ethnic divisions are more costly whenever institutions are weak17.
The early work of Ferejohn (1986) already suggested that distributional concerns among
the citizenry could weaken accountability. In his intuition, different groups compete to be
included i the winning coalition of the ruler, thus bidding away all the rents. The nature of
my mechanism is very different: a ruler is tied to her group, but the prospect of future exclusion
forces supporters to defend the regime and keep the leader in power.
This paper is a contribution to the literature on political economy of less developed polities.
Ellman and Wantchekon (2000), La Ferrara and Bates (2001), Robinson and Verdier (2002),
Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2002) and Robinson and Torvik (2002) present models of elec-
toral competition enriched to capture diverse characteristics of the political game in weakly
institutionalized polities. In particular, the presence of ascriptive groups in society, the absence
of commitment technology or the capacity to resort to violence are introduced to explain inef-
ficient policy choices and the presence of clientelism. Even though my model is not explicitly
electoral, it contributes to this literature by explaining why internal competition within the
ruling group cannot dissipate kleptocratic rents even in a repeated game framework.
Other previous formal analyses of weak institutions include Acemoglu and Robinson (2004),
Grossman (1991) and Grossman and Noh (1994) among many others. The general approach
is to model the leader as maximizing the amount of resources she can extract from the polity
subject to the constraint of remaining in power. I depart from previous work by capturing the
idea that divided societies provide the opportunity to marginalize and expropriate part of the
population, to the extent that weak institutions make it possible. The main mechanism in my
paper is close to the work of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) in which selectorate members give
support to the current ruler because the challenger cannot commit to provide future benefits.
I concentrate on the consequences and particularities of ethnic divisions among the elite and
population, and its interactions with non-institutionalized systems of succession.
Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004) explicitly address the puzzle of the existence of
kleptocratic rulers by noting that weak institutions imply that the leader can exacerbate the
collective action problem of society. If the collaboration of different groups is needed to replace
17For a self-contained discussion of the relevant empirical findings as well as a survey of the literature see
Alesina and La Ferrara (2003).
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the ruler, she can use the existence of ruler-friendly institutions to buy off a pivotal actor and
hence remain in power. The authors dub this strategy "divide-and-rule" following a tradition
in the Political Science literature. While there is little doubt that collective action problems
are important in explaining why autocratic leaders remain in power, my approach emphasizes
a different mechanism that does not exclude the previous one, and explains why some groups
actually explicitly give support to such kleptocratic leaders. In addition, my model generates
inefficiencies along the equilibrium path, a property that Acemoglu et. al (2004) does not
feature.
There is a growing formal literature on ethnic conflict1 8 . Caselli and Coleman (2003) provide
a rationale for why conflicts tend to be along ethnic lines: characteristics such as language and
skin color allow winners to exclude losers ex-post, hence changing the incentives to escalate
conflict ex-ante. The idea of the role of excludability is thus present in their model, but my
paper formalizes the idea that the elites are the ones contributing to and benefiting from ethnic
divisions, and then explains why the rest of the population follows. To understand this process,
it is crucial to separate the citizenry from the leadership, a notion that formal models of group
conflict do not tend to pursue19.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the model and
the equilibrium concept that will be used. Section III analyzes the model and describes the
equilibrium. Section IV contains a discussion on the interpretation of the model and its results,
stressing the comparative statics. Section V contains two extensions of the logic of the model.
One explains another general pattern of public expenditure in Africa: the preponderance of
wages over investment. A corollary on the relevance for ethnic violence is examined as well.
Finally, the last section concludes.
18See, for example, Fearon (1998),(2004) or Gershenson and Grossman (2000).
19Some papers have appeared that make this distinction: Glaeser (2002) proposes a model in which hate is
provided as a quasi-good by self-interested politicians to rational citizens who demand it. De Figueiredo and
Weingast (1999) explain widespread violence and the participation of the masses as the reaction to uncertainty
about the intentions of other groups and leaders.
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2.2 The Model
2.2.1 The Environment
Consider an infinitely repeated economy populated by a continuum of citizens of mass 1. Citi-
zens belong to one of two ethnic groups, A and B. The size of group A is rA. There are two
economic activities, denoted a and b. A group is defined by two distinct sets of characteristics.
First, there are some ascriptive characteristics such as skin color (maybe geographical distri-
bution or language) that are identifiable and, for simplicity, impossible to change20. Second,
each groups possesses a comparative advantage in a different portfolio of economic activities.
A group A citizen obtains wa per period in activity a. Should she decide to take activity b
she would earn a _ A per period. Symmetrically, a B citizen obtains wb in activity b and
W b _ 0 B in activity a, per period. Oi captures the extent to which a group's wealth is specific
to a particular activity. For example, if a group obtains its wealth from coffee, it can switch
its efforts tlo growing rice in their fields. Unfortunately, coffee trees are a long term specific
investment, and hence putting those lands to another use entails a loss of pre-tax income. In
general, a group that is specialized in cash-crops, especially tree crops, has no way to transfer
its planted capital to another activity. The same would be true for a group that obtains revenue
from natural resources that lie below its territory. On the other hand, Oi may simply capture
the degree to which specialized knowledge is useless in another sector. Finally, a small value of
Oi also captures the possibility that ethnic groups are not differentiated by economic activities.
For simplicity, assume that switching is allowed each period. Let z = 1 if group i does not
take the activity in which it enjoys comparative advantage in period t. Otherwise zt -= 0.
There is a state that performs two functions: it taxes economic activities and uses the
proceeds to provide benefits to groups.
These benefits might be public goods that are so dependent on taste that only one of the
groups enjoys them. The favoured interpretation is that they constitute pure patronage such
as the allocation of public resources to the region of a group in the form of "pork barrel" or the
granting of lucrative bureaucratic posts (or posts in the army, police, etc.) to members of the
favored group. The state is able to discriminate across recipients for public expenditure thanks
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20 In the spirit of Caselli and Coleman (2003)
to the ascriptive characteristics of groups.
On the other hand, taxes are activity specific because in particularly poor developing coun-
tries as in Africa, the absence of a competent bureaucracy forces the governments to raise their
revenue from indirect taxation. For instance, the use of Marketing Boards for agricultural
products and other manipulations of the pricing system2 1 are pervasive. In the context of the
model, I allow taxation to differ across group-activities, but the ability to imperfectly switch
activities will put a ceiling on how differently one can tax different sources of wealth. Thus
note that the fundamental difference between expenditures and taxation is that patronage can
be perfectly targeted to specific groups.
At any point in time, one ethnic group has control of the government. Even though a group
has the state nominally captured, real power is exercised by a narrow elite inside the group,
and I will call it the Leader. Denote by Li the leader if she is from group i. In the remainder
of the paper, I call the group to which the leader belongs "supporter" group, and the other is
denoted "excluded" group for reasons that will become apparent. Each group has an unlimited
supply of identical leaders from which to choose.
Denote -rik the tax level that a leader of group i levies on activity k. Similarly, let 7ij be the
amount that leader of group i spends on patronage for group j. Obviously i, j E {A, B} and
k C a, b}. The amount ij provides utility R(, ij ) to group j with R' > 0, R'(O) > 1, R' < 0
and R(0) = . Group -j receives no utility from 7i j.
This economy has two fundamental states, St E {A, B}, denoting whether power is captured
by group A or group B in period t.
The instantaneous utility of a citizen of group A in state S (the expression for B is just
symmetric) is thus:
C(S, zA) = (1 - zA)(wA - Sa) zA(WA - A TSb) + R( 7fSA)
where time subscripts have been omitted for notational simplicity.
Both groups have identical preferences represented by E Et-o 6 t C ti where Cti is the con-
sumption of group j at time t, and 6 is the discount factor.
21Bates (1981) provides a detailed account of these practices. In addition, Bates (1989) shows that these
manipulations are inefficient to the point of contributing to famines.
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Even though the leader belongs to group St she has self-serving interests. In particular, she
wants to maximize the funds that she can divert for her own uses. A leader of group A obtains
instantaneous utility (the expression for B is just symmetric) as long as she is in power:
UA = 7A(TAa _ BAA) + (1 - 7 rA)(TAb _ AB)
and discounts future payoffs by . The expression assumes that there is no switching in equi-
librium. When a leader is not in power, she obtains 0 utility per period.
The weakness of institutions and the importance of ascriptive links is captured in the model
by the following assumptions. First, assume that whenever the incumbent leader retains the
support of her kin group, she maintains her position with probability 9Y4. With probability
1 - /A group B is able to dislodge the leader from power and install a B leader even against a
united A group. A might be well above rA to capture the notion that weakness of institutions
and the strength of ethnic links allow for a huge degree of incumbency advantage. This is the
sense in which a group might be able to capture power. The unique credible source of support
and thus the unique credible promise of future patronage is given by the ruler's ethnic linkage
22with her own group .
Second, if the supporters of an incumbent leader decide to subvert the authority of their
leader and want to oust her from power, they succeed automatically. Hence the relevant con-
straint on the rapacious interests of the leader is the need to keep the support of her group.
This is the sense in which the position of the leader is weak: she needs the active support of a
sizable share of the population to maintain power.
Third, when a leader is ousted from power by her own supporters the state does not perform
its functions for that period. Moreover, the group that is not in power will find it easier to
use this opportunity to grab power and seat a leader from its ranks. This captures the reality
of Personal Rule regimes in which successions are always uncertain matters, resolved in non-
institutionalized ways. Thus, I assume that the status of the group in power will change
with probability 1 -_7. fs captures the degree to which the grip on power of group S is
22The group has to feature two characteristics: firstly, it has to be very costly to change one's identity ex-post.
Secondly, the ruler has to be able to commit to use the same basis of support in the future. The experience in
Africa and elsewhere suggests that ethnic allegiances possess both features.
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solid in independently of the personality of the ruler. In other words, Ys - S > 0 captures
the importance of "Personal Rule" since it measures the increased stability that retaining the
incumbent buys to her supporters.
The timing of each stage game, given state St, is the following:
1. Leader LS announces the policy vector Pt = {TSa, S bSA, B}
2. The citizens of group St decide to "subvert," st = 1 or not, st = 0
3. All groups decide to switch activities or not, z, zi E {0, 1}
4. If st = 0, Pt is implemented and payoffs are realized. Next period starts with St+l = St
with probability ys and the state switches with probability 1 - s.
5. If st -= 1, the leader is ousted immediately and the "revolt" vector Pr = 0, 0, 0,0} is
implemented. With probability 1 - S , group S loses power and the next period starts
with St+l = -St. Otherwise, the next period starts with a new leader from group S.
There are a number of features of the model that are worth stressing. First, note that
collective action within a group is not an issue in this model. The focus of the argument is on
the forces that allow rents to be appropriated by a weak leader instead of competed away by
different elites inside the same group. Adding heterogeneity and a collective action problem
would only help the current leader to steal even more, because she would find it easier to disrupt
coordination. Second, and in the same spirit, I do not allow the leader access to any repression
instrument: if she loses the support of her group, she is replaced at no explicit cost.
Finally, note that no difference is made between democracy and dictatorship in the model.
The evidence from Africa shows that democracies have not behaved differently than dictator-
ships at the time of supporting kleptocracies and corruption23. In my analysis, the reason is
that both types of regimes have been able to play ethnic divisions and patronage networks in
exactly the same ways. The analysis will reveal that institutional reform needs to go further
than getting people to vote. It has to include effective constraints on the capacity of the lead-
ers to treat ethnic groups differently, and it should include mechanisms directed to smooth
intra-group competition.
23See Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh (2002), Jackson and Rosberg (1982) or Mbaku (2000) among others.
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2.2.2 Definition of Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept to be used is (pure strategy) Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In this type
of equilibria, strategies can only be contingent on the payoff-relevant state of the world and the
prior actions taken within the same period.
As has been described above, the state space of this economy includes only two elements,
= {A, B}, denoting whether power is captured by group A or group B at the beginning of
period t. Denote the state at each period by St, where obviously St C 0, Vt = 0,1, 2.... Assume
that each group has a set of potential leaders from which replacements will be drawn randomly.
Call these two sets of leaders AA and AB. At any point in time, the leader in power is denoted
by LA or LB depending on the group she was drawn from. Denote by LA the potential leaders
that belong to AA but are not in power currently. -LB is defined symmetrically. The strategy
of the current leader LA is denoted by pA and it is a four-tuple {TAa, TAb, AA, 7AB} E 4
when St = A. When either St = B or St = A but a leader belongs to -LA, her set of strategies
is empty. The symmetric definition holds for the strategies of leaders LB.
The strategy of group A is denoted aA(S/Ps) and depends on both the state of political
capture and the policy vector proposed by the leader. It determines two actions, {sA, zA}
that have been defined above as the decision to subvert and the decision to switch economic
activities. If St = A, sA E {0, 1}, that is, if the leader is from group A, this group can decide to
give her support or to subvert her authority. On the other hand, if St = B, sA = 0. A C {0, 1}
independently of the state. The symmetric definition holds for the strategy space of citizens of
group B.
State transitions work as follows: whenever stS = 0, St+ = St with probability 9s and the
state switches with probability 1 - 9s. If sts = 1, that is, if there is subversion, St+1 = St with
probability -ys. Denote this transition function T(us, S).
A (pure strategy) Markov Perfect Equilibrium for this game is a combination of strategies
denoted by {pA, pB, &A, &B} such that all four strategies are best responses to the other three
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for all possible states. In particular, consider the following set of Bellman equations:
VA(S) = max{CA(S, pS, cA(S/PS), &B) +6 VA(S')T(s, S)} (2.1)
A SESS13
VB(S) = max{CB(S, pS 0,B(s/pS) &A) + E VB(S')T s, S) (2.2)
~s~~~~~~~~ SE8
WLA(A) = max{UA(pA, A, B) + 6 E WA(S')T(&A(A/pA),A)} (2.3)pA se
SEO
WLB(B) = max{UB(pB, B, A) + 6 E WB(SI)T(&B(B/pB),B)} (2.4)pB se
SEO
where Ci denotes the consumption of citizen j as a function of the state S and the strategies
of the leader in power and both sets of citizens. V (S) denotes the value function for citizen
j in state S. WL (S) denotes the value function for leader from group i in state S, when she
is the current leader Ls. To complete the definition, note that WA(B), W4A (A), WB (A)
and W-BB (B) are completely independent of any decision that the particular leader could take.
They only depend on the probability that, in equilibrium, a particular leader will be in power
in the future. As a consequence, these are not interesting strategic objects in this game. A
Markov Perfect Equilibrium is thus a combination of strategies {f PA , PB, A, &B} such that &A
solves (2.1), &B solves (2.2), pA solves (2.3) and P B solves (2.4).
2.3 Analysis
Assume without loss of generality that St = A. The equilibrium is characterized by backwards
induction within each stage game. I examine first the decision to switch the sector of production.
Take B producers first. Note that the decision to switch does not affect continuation utilities,
hence only the static difference in payoffs is relevant. After observing the policy vector Pt, they
will switch sector only if the loss in wealth is smaller than the difference in taxation. Formally,
zt = iff b TAb < w b _ B _ Aa
Since it is in the interest of the ruler not to allow this switch, which is wasteful, this ability to
switch provides an upper bound on the differential taxation that the ruler can levy on group
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B. The effective constraint on the ruler will thus be
TAb < 0 B + TAa (2.5)
The equivalent restriction for group A is then
TA a < A + TAb (2.6)
Obviously, both restrictions cannot be binding at the same time.
I examine now the decision to subvert by A supporters. Note that the leader is the first
player to act in the stage game. As a consequence, since strategies can only be conditional
on the state of the economy, a leader LA always proposes the same policy vector pA. Upon
observing pA, if there is no subversion (st = 0), A supporters obtain:
Wa TAa + R(qAA) + &5AVA(A) + (1 -_A)VA(B)
Alternatively, if they subvert, st = 1, they expect:
a
-YA AVA(A) + (1 _ A)VA(B)
Hence the non-subversion condition reduces to:
ITAa - R(7JAA) < 6 ( 'A _- 7A)(vA(A) VA(B)) (2.7)
Note that the ruler will always satisfy this constraint by subgame perfection. Not satisfying it
gives her no benefit because in the period she is thrown out she already receives 0 utility, plus
she will obtain 0 forevermore, while being in power implies receiving positive rents each period.
Hence in any MPE there will never be any ousting of a ruler. Therefore the only possibility
of a change of state is the excluded group wrestling power away from the supporter group,
which happens each period with probability 1 - yS. In equilibrium the continuation values for
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a citizen A can thus be expressed as:
VA(A) = a _ TrAa -+ R(7AA) + 6AVA(A) + 6(1 -~A)VA(B)
VA(B) = a - rBa + R(?7BA) + 5tYBVA(B) + 6(1 - B)VA(A)
Solving these equations for VA(A) - VA(B) and substituting the resulting expression in
(2.7), the no-subversion constraint can be written in terms of the equilibrium value of policy:
(- A - A)
-R(ZAA) 1 -- ) B[Ba _ R(iBA) _ Aa R(AA)]
Where the superscript denotes equilibrium values. For notational simplicity I will denote
(I (A _,.yA) [B AA= 1+(j_ffA_fB) Ba _ R(BA) - Aa + R(AA)]. This term summarizes the way in which
future equilibrium play affects present decisions. With these ingredients, now I am able to posit
the problem of ruler LA:
max IrA(ta - AA) + (1 - rA)(TAb _- AB) + 6.~AWA (A) (2.8)
{iAa ,TAb,7AA ,AB}
subj.to TAb < B + TAa [A]
rAa < A + ' Ab [IV]
TrAa - R( ]AA) < IA [P]
o < vAB [p]
The ruler thus maximizes her returns per period, conditional on avoiding any wasteful switching
and subversion. The first order conditions of this program yield:
IrA +A- v-/ = 0 (2.9)
1-rA - A + , = 0 (2.10)
_7rA + zR(nAA) = 0 (2.11)
-(1 _ rA)+p = 0 (2.12)
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The first order conditions are simple and easy to interpret. From (2.12) it is obvious that
DAB = 0. The reason is that providing patronage good to the excluded group is costly and
yields no benefit, since what is critical is the support from the leader's group. From (2.9) and
(2.10) and the fact that A and v cannot both be strictly positive at the same time we learn that
v = 0, A = - rA and = 1. = 0 implies that the second restriction is not saturated. The
analysis thus reveals that the ruler endogenously chooses to discriminate against the "excluded"
group. Quite intuitively the leader will tax the excluded group as much as she can, that is, to
the point in which the first constraint is binding.
Since this first constraint is binding, every dollar that the ruler is able to tax her own
supporters is worth more than one dollar for her, because it allows her to increase taxation
on the excluded group. Note from (2.11) that multiplies the return from the last unit of
patronage given to group A. The cost of this last unit is only 7rA, but its return is increased
taxation from the whole population (because p = 1). This disparity is the reason for inefficient
overprovision of patronage. The mechanism works as follows: the non-subversion constraint is
binding and hence an increase in R(r1 AA) allows the ruler to increase taxation on her supporters.
Since the no-switching constraint is also binding, taxation on the excluded group increases in
parallel. Hence, increasing patronage spending on her group allows the ruler to increase revenue
raising from the whole population, while a social planner would take into account that only a
fraction of the population receives utility from this patronage. This distortion is thus worse the
narrower the basis of support of the ruler (the smaller rA).
Formally, the stage program yields the following solution:
RAB = 0 (2.13)
R(,AA) = 7rA (2.14)
Aa = ± + R(,AA) (2.15)
rAb = 0 B + ,A + R(,AA) (2.16)
The solution for patronage public goods (2.13) and (2.14) is thus independent of expectations of
future play, but this is not the case for the amount of resources that the leader can extract from
both groups. In fact, the solution above presents a mapping between future equilibrium play
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and current taxation. Remember that, in equilibrium, another symmetric problem is solved by
any LB leader in power. The solution to the program for LB is:
r/BA = 0
RI'(r7BB) = 1-rA
TBb = 4B + R(rBB) (2.17)
Ta= oA + 4B + R(VBB) (2.18)
Denote the mapping from expectations to current play F(~A, B) = (TAa, TAb, Ba, TBb), given
by (2.15), (2.16), (2.17) and (2.18). Moreover, the definition of DA (and the symmetric definition
of tbB) provides a mapping from actual play to consistent expectations (-TAa, .TAb, .Ba, TBb) =
(IcA, 4JCB). The equilibrium posits the requirement that these expectations be consistent with
future play. In this context this reduces to finding a fixed point of the mapping that relates
expectations into themselves: (F()A, .B)) = (4 )CA, ~cB). Explicitly, this mapping is the
following:
~CA jY y) o ) nBC = 1 + 6(jA _ yA - B B) + R(rTBB) - A - R(AA) + R(lAA)]
I d -B6 - _B)
,CB = (.B _  ) B D + jA + R( AA) _ DB _ R(77BB) + R(]BB)]
1+ 6~~( -5A 5)
For simplicity denote Pi' T l+6(lAXB). Solving this system for the fixed point (~A, ~B) =
(INCA, DCB) yields:
-= VA(1+ pB)(OA + R(77BB)) + IpAAiB(OB + R(77AA))
1 + A B
4B pB(1 + 41A)( OB + R(7rAA)) + TATB( OA + R( 77BB))
1 + qjA + TjB
Since there is a single fixed point, uniqueness of MPE is shown. This discussion establishes the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 The model presents a unique MPE. In equilibrium, in state S = A (when
S = B the expressions are symmetric):
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1. LA proposes the following policy vector:
AA AA rAA 7A such that R' (r ) = 
AB o
TAa qA(1 + qpB)QA + TAqpB(B
T~ q- (2.19)1 + A + I/B
(1 + XA)(1 + qB)R( 7jA) + pA(I + B)R(B)
+ 62A + RB
TAb _ lA(1 + ffB)A + (1 + gA)( B) + (2.20)
(1 + qA)(1 + WB)R(71A) + pA(l + qB)R( 77B)
+ 62A + B
2. The citizens of group A accept this policy vector: A = 0
3. No activity switch occurs: zA = B = 
This MPE is related to the unique equilibrium of the finite horizon version of this game:
denote by FT a game with exactly the same stage game as the model presented above, but
repeated a finite number of times T. Since this game has a final stage, backwards induction
can be used to find the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the finite game. The following
proposition establishes a link between this unique SPE and the unique MPE of the infinite
horizon game.
Proposition 2 Consider a game FT. Then:
1. T has a unique SPE
2. The limit as T - oo of the unique SPE of rT yields the same payoffs as the MPE described
in Proposition 1
The proof of this proposition can be found in the Appendix24. This convergence exists
because both equilibria are qualitatively identical: in both of them, the incumbent is never
24This result follows from uniqueness of SPE in the finite horizon game and uniqueness of MPE in the infinite
horizon game (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). Nonetheless, the proof in the appendix is constructive in the
context of this game.
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ousted, and she steals from her own supporters exactly the difference between staying under
her rule and the lottery between replacements. It helps the intuition to examine what happens
in the last period. The incumbent has to leave her supporters indifferent between ousting
her and giving her support. Since there is no future, she cannot threaten them with a bleak
perspective and hence she has to give them at least w 4 utility. She does exactly this by taxing
them TAa R(,A) because this allows her to maximize extraction from the excluded group.
Note that this creates a wedge between being in the supporter versus the excluded group in the
last period that the leader can exploit in T - 1, T - 2... Hence, starting in T - 1, the leader
can reduce her supporter's utility below wA. The further away from the end of the game, the
less the contraint of giving wA to the supporters in the last period binds. Hence, the payoffs
converge to the ones in the MPE from above2 5 .
2.4 Discussion and Interpretation
The first subsection underscores a number of equilibrium characteristics and interprets them
under the light of ethnic bias in Africa. The second one highlights the main lesson extracted
from the game-theoretical modeling of the mechanism: any reason that allows one type of ruler
to steal will spread throughout the economy to allow the venality of any type of ruler. The role
of weak institutions is examined afterwards, shedding some light on the unwillingness of African
leaders to develop their institutional framework. A final subsection explores the applicability of
the specific mechanism developed in the model to different social and institutional frameworks
than the ones pervasive in Africa.
2.4.1 Policy Determination and Ethnic Bias
The unique MPE of the model provides an explanation for many features of the post-colonial
political economy of Africa.
25The model presents other SPE. For instance, citizens can use the MPE as a punishment device in trigger
strategies equilibria in which they force the leader to present them with a particular level of utility, under the
threat of being replaced. If the group that is supposed to replace does not do so, then the play jumps to the MPE
forever. In any case, these equilibria need a lot of coordination behind the "veil of ignorance", and a problem of
divided societies is precisely that groups find it very difficult to trust, communicate and coordinate across ethnic
lines. Avoiding dialog across groups is the basis of the "divide and rule" strategies played by the rulers.
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First, the model endogenously generates inefficient policies. Note that in the simple frame-
work proposed here, the unique potential source of inefficiency is the excessive allocation of
patronage to a particular group. Since the opportunity cost of public funds is 1, the fact that
the marginal return to patronage for the supporter group is 7rA < 1 shows that political needs
cause inefficiencies. This feature of the equilibrium helps explain the patterns of inefficient
taxation and inefficient transfers coexisting in the same group highlighted in the seminal work
by Bates (981) for agricultural policies in tropical Africa. The ruler needs to buy support from
her own group while, at the same time, wants to extract a lot of resources from the economy.
The best way of doing so, given the absence of lump-sum taxation, is by taxing both groups
and then returning some patronage to the supporters even if this is highly wasteful. This is a
general pattern of statism in Africa.
Second, the model predicts a very strong bias in the allocation of public funds. The excluded
group receives no public benefits while the supporter group receives public resources beyond
the optimal point. The use of public money in the form of bureaucratic posts, infrastructure
or even access to schools as a form of patronage, as well as the ethnic bias in the allocation
of these goods has been widely documented in Africa. Gikuyus and later Kalenjin in Kenya,
northern groups in both Nigeria and Uganda or Tutsis in Burundi are just salient examples
that reproduce across the continent. The bias in favor of the ruling group is conspicuous and
is actually one of the basic sources of resentment between ethnic groups 2 6 . Not only access to
these positions is biased, but is accompanied by an absence of meritocratic pressure that makes
them ripe for all kinds of corruption, official and unofficial 27 .
Third, the bias is not only present in the allocation of patronage: taxation is also differential
across groups. In particular, in addition to taxes levied on the supporter group, the model
shows that the excluded group is expropriated from the non-transferable share of its wealth.
Bates (1981) and Bates (1989) provide evidence of this pattern: in Ghana and Uganda, among
other examples, the coalition that supported the leader extracted resources from the coffee and
cocoa planters. These are crops that involve a lot of specific long term investment. On the
contrary, in Kenya the Gikuyu controlled the coffee growing parts of the country, and hence
2 6 See Horowitz (1985), Bates (1983)
27See Collier and Garg (1999) for an account of how ethnic and kinship ties are rewarded in the form of salaries.
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the discrimination against these crops was much less evident.
The combination of higher taxation and absence of patronage makes the excluded group
obviously worse off than the supporter group. As a consequence, whenever there is a change in
the group controlling power, the patterns of taxation change and purges follow in order to make
space for the new elites. For instance, the ascension to power by Moi in Kenya was followed by
a substitution of Gikuyus by Kalenjin in all echelons of the state28. In Ghana, cocoa has been
heavily taxed by all governments, civil and military, except the one headed by Kofi Busia, a
native from the Ashanti region which contains a large share of smallholders that grow cocoa.
In Cameroon, the substitution of Ahidjo in 1982 unleashed another deep ethnic purge of the
bureaucracy. Similar dynamics are found in Nigeria. Ironically, these purges tend to take place
under the excuse of anti-corruption initiatives. These switches prove the use of public resources
as patronage, as well as the conscious status of "ruling" groups versus "excluded" groups.
This pattern of discrimination both in raising revenue and in public expenditures supports
the vision that a particular ethnic group has the government captured29. The model suggests
that the actual benefits of such capture are not spread throughout the group. The particular
elite that holds power extracts so much resources that part of this money comes from the
pockets of non-elite members of the group. In equilibrium it is very easy to see that (2.19) can
be rewritten as -Aa = A + R(7/A). Hence, since 4 A > 0, this is exactly the amount by which
the ruler is able to reduce her followers' utility. The next subsection studies the determinants
of 4A.
This result is also consistent with casual empiricism. In Kenya, a potential political cleavage,
and a reason why Kenyatta used the ethnic card to maintain power was the situation of landless
Gikuyus, most of them ex Mau Mau fighters. These downtrodden masses did not obtain
anything from the regime, even though it was clear to all observers and political participants
that Kenyatta was at the helm of a "Gikuyu" regime. Emphasizing the fact that the majority
of Gikuyu were not actually receiving their share of the spoils was obviously threatening to the
regime. That is why the leadership had to act hastily whenever any political entrepreneur tried
28See Barkan and Chege (1989) for an account of the reallocation of posts and resources.
29 These dynamics have been crystalized in the much repeated sentence "it is our turn to eat". See, for example,
Wa Wamwere (2003).
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to shed light on these facts. This included the assassination of a popular politician in 19753°.
Wa Wamwere (2003) describes this absence of balance in the reception of spoils in a colorful
way:
"The cream of government service goes to the ruling ethnic elites, the crumbs
to the lesser ethnic elites, and dust to members of the so-called ruling ethnic com-
munity" and "Among the Gikuyu of Kenya, the approving masses are called grill
lickers, njuna ndara".
The fact that non-elites are not receiving much from the government is by no means unique
31to Kenya .
Fourth, the results of the model rationalize the existence of kleptocratic elites supported by
masses of impoverished ethnic followers. Even though in absolute terms the masses are made
worse off by the existence of rent-creating policies, in relative terms it is much better to belong to
the group in power than to the excluded group, and hence they are willing to defend the status
quo vis a vis a leader from another group. The members of a narrow elite around the leader
are thus the ones extracting the lion's share of the rents that these inefficient policies create.
Evidence of Kleptocratic tendencies abound in Africa, but Mobutu's Zaire is probably the most
cited example. Sani Abacha in Nigeria or Daniel arap Moi in Kenya have been able to amass
personal fortunes counted in the billions of dollars 32 . Even a relatively well-considered leader,
such as Houphouet-Boigny in Cote d'Ivoire had his share of personal aggrandizement projects,
such as a marble covered cathedral in his home town. Consistent with this concentration of
wealth at the highest levels of leadership, Africa is the continent with highest capital flight33.
2.4.2 Amplification of Kleptocracy
The theoretical reason that supports kleptocratic regimes in this model is summarized in ex-
pression (2.7). It makes clear that as long as the supporter group observes a difference between
30See Throup and Hornsby (1998:19). They write that this leader was "(...) attempting to mobilize the
kikuyu masses -the masakini (literally, the poor)- against the conspicuous wealth of the kikuyu elite, especially
Kenyatta's relatives and close allies."
31 "Ordinarily it is the representatives and fiduciaries of ethnic groups, more than the general members, who
gain privileges or suffer punishments under systems of personal rule," from Jackson and Rosberg (1983)
3 2 See Ayittey (1992), Wa Wamwere (2003), Mbaku (2000) or any account of corruption in Africa.
33Collier and Gunning (1999)
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being in the supporter status and being excluded under the leadership of the opponent group,
there is a surplus that the current leader can expropriate from her own supporters. In addition,
the more a leader can extract from her supporters, the more she can extract from the excluded
group, thanks to (2.5) being binding in equilibrium. As a consequence, there is an amplification
effect of any characteristic of the economy that allows one ruler to steal.
Assume that the institutional or economic technology of this society changes so that LB is
now able to steal more from her group if she is ever in power. An A citizen understands that,
in equilibrium, this will mean that should he ever fall into an excluded status, his plight will
be worse. This reduces VA(B) in equilibrium. But obviously, this looses the non-subversion
constraint for LA and as a consequence, LA is able to increase Aa to the point where her
supporters are again indifferent between giving her support or subverting and taking a lottery
that now is much less favorable, since both VA(A), and VA(B) are reduced. This amplification
mechanism is the reason why in the expressions for equilibrium taxation in Proposition 1 the
economic and institutional characteristics of both groups appear.
Expression (2.19) can be rewritten to identify the substantive forces that allow the leader
to reduce the utility of her own group:
Aa pA(1 + pB)QA + qJAxBOB XAQBR(,A) + TA(1 + TB)R(+B)
= ~~~~+1 + + ~A+ NO + R(1 A ) (2.21)~~ ~~1 + A + pB QA+ 
The gap between TAa and R(z/A) is exactly 1A, the amount the ruler reduces her supporters'
utility. It is easy to see that the forces that allow leaders to create a wedge between supporters
and excluded are their ability to discriminate in taxation, captured by the first summand and
their capacity to allocate patronage, captured by the second summand in (2.21). Hence, both
tools that the ruler can manipulate in this reduced form model are used. If the ethnic structure
does not coincide with an economic sectorial cleavage or there are no important specificities in
the economy (this would be a case in which OA and 0 B are small) the ruler cannot discriminate
in taxation but patronage still makes a difference in the utility of her supporters and hence
they are still reluctant to increase the probability of an ethnic switch in the leadership.
In the model, the net amount of funds that the leader LA is able to extract equals XA =
A + R( 71A) + (1 - A)0B - 1r Ax A. By the envelope theorem (and because = 1 in (2.8)), all
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the interesting effects enter through MA:
aXA &DA A(1 + B)
0)A s = O0A 1 + p A + B >0
aXA __f A ipAOB
0B -0A + 1 + A + TB 1- > o
The amount of expropriation from both groups, independently of the allegiance of the leader,
is increasing in the share of non-transferable resources in the economy. This result implies that
starting from a situation with low OAand 0 B, an increase in the share of non-transferable
wealth anywhere in the economy increases equilibrium misbehavior by the ruler. In the case of
a citizen of group A, and increase in 0A implies increased expropriation by a potential LB. As
a consequence, she allows her leader to steal more from her. An increase in 0B has two effects:
the direct one comes from the tax markup that LA charges on group B. In addition, there is
the amplification effect: an increase in 0 B means that the B citizens will be afraid of losing
power if they ever regain it, and hence a B leader will be able to steal more from them and, as
a consequence, steal more from A citizens that would be excluded in that case. Therefore an
increase in 0 B allows LA to reduce her supporters' utility further. These comparative statics
provide a rationale for the well documented "natural resource curse": an increase in 9i may
capture the discovery of some mineral resource in the land of a particular group.
Comparative statics with respect to the ethnic demographic balance are ambiguous. On
the one hand, all the direct effects predict a reduction in stealing: increasing 7rA reduces the
benefits from distorting the patronage good for two reasons. First, rents are reduced at each
level of provision because it becomes more expensive to provide it. Moreover, the optimal level
of distortion is reduced because the returns are reduced (less people in the excluded group to
pay for it).
In addition, increasing rA reduces the fraction of population excluded, and hence reduces
the extra revenue that comes from the extraction of their non-transferable resources.
However, there is a third, indirect effect, that makes the overall effect ambiguous: increasing
7rA means that, should group A ever lose power, a potential LB would be able to steal more:
she would increase distortions in the allocation of *B because her basis of support would now be
smaller. Using the same logic of amplification, this allows an LA leader extra room for stealing.
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Explicitly, the partial derivative has the following expression:
axA AB R'(71A) A B A( + B) R(/*B)
OrA 1 + qA + B R"(, A ) 1 + A + UB R(7B)
The first two summands represent the rents lost from the ability to distort ERA and the third is the
direct loss that is a consequence of the smaller size of the excluded group. The last summand
represents the indirect effect, and it is positive3 4 . For general functional forms of R(.) this
expression cannot be signed, but note that if R(.) is a power function, is increasing in 7.R" c(
Hence, if the third indirect effect ever dominates, it will do so at high levels of wA. That is,
when the A group includes a wide majority of the population, the prospect of falling under a
B leader is most terrifying because LB will have a very narrow basis of support, and hence she
will use extreme distortions of patronage to steal.
2.4.3 The Effect of Institutions on Rent-Seeking
If the probability of an ethnic turnover captures the degree of institutional strength, it is
informative to analyze the comparative statics of stealing with respect to these set of parameters.
In particular, it is easy to show that:
aXA a_0 A _ DA aA aA A TB
- - ~~~~~ ~ > 0
aaA QaA OUSA a.TA + Q@B oTA °
aXA 9 0bA a_1A a A A xp B
--
&y~~~A 0 -- iiA &OyA ±- &4iB OjA <.0OXA a_ A 94A OaA a A apB
aAA aaA SPA ETA + -5B >T 0 aXA OA aD QA ~A aa B
O.yA 02yA -- O A ~,A -}- O B O A '
aX A aODA aq)A ap!A 9 A aT B
0YB arYB - A 0fB + B 0 B < 0
None of these comparative statics are ambiguous35. From these comparative statics it is clear
that the level of rent extraction is increasing in both (HA _ ,A) and (B - TB). The first one
is obvious from contraint (2.7): the leader can extract more resources from her followers the
more their probability of keeping power depends on maintaining this particular leader. In other
34 Recall that it is assumed that R" < 0
35 The expressions for each partial derivative are listed in Appendix 2 for completion.
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words, the incumbency advantage (A - YA) makes "fear" (VA(A)- VA(B)) a real possibility
and thus scales its impact. The fact that LA can expropriate more the bigger 5B_ -B is follows
from the logic of amplification of kleptocracy discussed in the previous subsection.
Hence stealing increases with institutional uncertainty and personality-dependent control of
power. In particular, the leader would like to reduce the grip on power of her followers if she
is ousted, while at the same time strengthen her ethnic group position vis-A-vis the excluded
group as ong as she is in power. While these parameters depend on characteristics of the
polity beyond the control of the ruler, such as the demographic ethnic balance, it certainly also
depends on institutional factors.
These comparative statics explain the weakening of the correlation between ethnic fraction-
alization and bad economic outcomes at high levels of institutional development. Even with
a divided society a leader cannot extract much from the citizenry if the hold in power of a
particular group and the stability of a particular regime does not depend on the personal links
of the ruler on top. This reduction on personality dependent incumbency advantage is precisely
a sign of institutional strength and hence it is not surprising that the margin to misbehave in
strongly institutionalized polities is very much reduced.
This model is not the right framework to think about questions of institutional develop-
ment but the logic of the mechanism shows that the leader has no incentive to strengthen the
institutional framework if this means increasing her accountability. This sheds light on several
facts.
First, this is consistent with the behavior of the leadership in most African countries: from
the moment of independence, even the first prophetic leaders such as Nkrumah, clamped down
on opposition, banned political parties, used the police and the military in a partisan way, did
not respect judicial independence or any kind of separation of powers and imposed censorship
on the press. These are not actions of rulers interested in institutional consolidation. These
actions repress both excluded groups and potential replacement leaders from the group of the
current leader, thus increasing y'i _ 'yi.
Second, it is very important for the leaders not to allow the presence of a strong and obvious
second-in-command. This would permit her followers to replace her and quickly coordinate on
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giving support to this alternative focal point and thus reduce the risk of being taken over36.
In the context of the model, this would increase yi. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) write "As
long as a ruler retains command in African states, an overriding consideration in succession
rivalries is that they be concealed from him". The reason given in their book is that presenting
candidacy as successor may signal the politician as an ambitious man keen on substituting the
ruler, and hence a potential target for oppression. The reason in the model proposed in this
paper is more general. Even if the successor could guarantee not to plot against the ruler, his
mere designation reduces institutional uncertainty and, as a consequence, reduces the margin
of the leader to steal. A typical way of getting rid of close collaborators that have become too
powerful or focal, and therefore a potential threat is to claim their involvement in a coup plot
against the current leader. Note that this is also a pervasive feature of regimes of personal
rule 37 .
2.4.4 Beyond Africa
This mechanism is especially relevant in explaining the extent of kleptocracy, clientelism and in-
efficiency in Africa because of the continent's societal characteristics and the political constraints
which its leaders face, but by no means it is exclusive to politics in Africa. To extrapolate the
argument to other circumstances, the key ingredients of the mechanism have to be described in
detail.
First, existence of groups is necessary. Two characteristics of group definition are essential:
it has to be very difficult to cross the group division ex-post, and it has to be possible to
specifically target the utility of the groups with policy. The saliency of ethnicity in Africa
creates a natural rigid dividing line. However, a strong ideological divide would suffice. For
instance, a citizen can classify herself as a moral conservative, and she knows that tomorrow she
will most probably still be a moral conservative. Some dimensions of policy, such as religious
and moral tolerance affect her utility differently from the utility of a liberal person. For example,
Divorce Legalization probably increases the utility of a socially liberal person but reduces that
36 There are numerous accounts of the obsession of long term leaders in refusing to designate anybody as a
successor, being Malawi's Banda probably the most notorious.
37Sekou Toure's Guinea was famous for the ridiculous amount of coup plots allegedly discovered against the
leader. See Jackson and Rosberg (1982) or Cartwright (1983) for an account of these facts.
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of a moral conservative.
Second, the group-identity of the leader has to be able to create a difference between the
payoff of groups. The absence of institutional constraints enlarges the set of policies that the
African ruler can use to widen the utility gap between supporters and opposition. In particular,
an African leader can use violence, discrimination and patronage to increase the utility of her
supporters and reduce that of the excluded. As institutional strength increases, the leader
faces a reduction in her set of feasible discriminatory policies. Nonetheless, the identity of the
leader still makes a difference in issues such as social policy and foreign policy which can target
ideological groups differently even in strongly institutionalized democracies. Given the group-
identity of the ruler, she is able to commit to these policies in the future and, as a consequence,
enlist the support of her group.
Third, support from the group must make a difference in maintaining the leader in power.
Arguably, in an African Personal Rule regime, the ability to mobilize ethnic allegiances is essen-
tial for the survival of the leader. Moreover, since succession mechanisms are not established,
uncertainty follows subversion. However, to some extent, every voter in a strongly institution-
alized democracy faces a similar dilemma: the only way for the voter to punish a perceived
deviation 3 8 from a leader from her group is not to vote for her. Unfortunately, by withholding
the vote, the voter is marginally increasing the probability that a candidate from the opposite
group is elected, which entails a loss in utility.
Hence, the difference between a well-functioning democracy and the kleptocracies that are
present in Africa is just one of degree: strong institutions limit the extent to which a group can
capture power and restrict the set of tools that the leader can use to widen the gap between
supporters and the opposition. As a consequence, stealing or shirking in office is restrained. As
institutions place less constraints on the leader and societal divisions grow wider, accountability
of the rulers is weakened. In the case of Africa, both circumstances occur in their extreme form
and, as a consequence, outright kleptocracy is sustainable.
38Strong institutions affect the possibility of outright stealing in western countries. But there are many
instances of ideological shirking or other ways in which the ruler extracts a personal benefit at a cost for her
supporters.
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2.5 Extensions
2.5.1 On Public Investment
The evidence from Africa shows that governments overspend in wages and undertake very little
of infrastructure construction39. The intuition from the model clarifies why this is the case.
Note that in the model wages are explicitly considered. The nature of patronage 'q is such
that it is a flow concept that has to be pledged at every stage and has no consequences for the
future. Public wages fall into this category: bureaucrats can easily be replaced or moved to
different areas. As a consequence, by expanding public sector employment beyond optimality
among her supporters and placing them in their area, the leader creates a network of clients
personally invested on the continuation of the status quo. This is a reason besides outright
corruption and misappropriation why public sector wages swallow a much bigger share of public
expenditures in Africa than in other less developed economies.
A simple extension of the model that includes the possibility to invest in durable infrastruc-
tures clarifies which kind of projects suffer from underinvestment when the leader can use
divisions and weak institutions to capture the support of her group.
Assume that the policy vector ptS ={TAa, TAb, 7AA, , AB, iA} is now a 5-tuple that includes
I, public investment. This investment contributes to a stock of public capital K. This stock
evolves according to the following dynamics: Kt = Kt-x + It-1. Hence, investment today
increases the stock of public capital tomorrow and this capital depreciates at a rate 1 - .
The stock of infrastructure provides a benefit F(K) to the supporter group and /3F(K) to the
excluded group, for /3 < 1. thus captures the degree of excludability of public infrastructure.
A pure public good would have/3 = 1. Assume that F' > 0 and F" < 0. If there is replacement
of a leader, the revolt vector is extended to Pr = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0} and therefore the government
does not invest for that period. Assume, finally, that when there is a revolt, the enjoyment of
the public infrastructure is reduced to 4'F(K), for < 1. captures the instantaneous cost of
upheaval.
To simplify the analysis, and in particular the dynamics that a new state variable could
39See Collier and Gunning (1999) for an account of these patterns. See also Mbaku (2000) and Bates (1981)
for some examples in Cameroon, Nigeria and Ghana of excess expenditure in wages.
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introduce, assume that leaders have no financial constraints and their instantaneous utility is
linear: UtA = 7 rA(rta -7tA) (1 At -1rA)A b - §-Kt). This implies that the optimal
level of capital in steady state will be reached as soon as a leader has a chance to invest. As
a consequence, the transitory that replacing the leader induces lasts only one period, precisely
because of the absence of investment when there is a revolt. Hence I can set the problem in
terms of the desired level of capital for next period kA, and investment will just be determined
as a residual: It = KA - KtA . In addition, assume that A B = 1, for expositional clarity
(in this case, support from the group is enough to keep power with certainty).
The model can be solved in exactly the same way as the previous case40 . In particular,
the Markov Perfect Equilibrium has the same characteristics: the leader in power satisfies the
constraint that makes her supporters indifferent between replacing her and supporting her rule.
Hence, in equilibrium there is no replacement of the leadership. To examine explicitly the new
support constraint, note that when supporters do not revolt, st = 0, they receive:
A a (?AA) A A A qA V24W _ -Aa ' + R(A) + F(K) + 6(wA _ T + R(t+1 ) + F(K )) + 62 VA (A)
On the other hand, if they revolt, st = 1, they obtain:
A++ V~F(K A ~WA _ TAa ± R (,qAA + A l 4 A _Ba;A 4. i'F(KA) 6(A[wA-A R(/t+l) ± F(KtA)] - (1 ?r)[JA t+t + /iF(KtA)]) 
+62(_AVA (A) +- (1 _ _A)VA(B))
Note that in writing these expected values I am already making use of the fact that the tran-
sitional period will only last one stage before setting into a new equilibrium level. Hence, the
support constraint, using stationarity, can be written as:
tAa- R(AA) +- ( - 1)F(K) + 6(1 - 7A)[tA+a - R(7t/) - tZ+I]- (2.22)
40The inclusion of a new state variable may create multiplicity of MPEa. For expositional ease I only analyze
the equilibrium most similar to the previous case in which strategies are not conditional on the stock of capital.
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-6F(KA+1) + 6[_A (1 - _A)]F(qKA)
(2
< - -(1 -A)[ Ba -3F(KB) - ~Aa + R(ZAA) + F(KA)]
-6 
The ruling leader faces a problem identical to (2.8) with an additional choice variable, KtA+1
and the support constraint replaced by (2.22). The first order conditions from this program
imply that the chosen level of KA+1 will be determined implicitly by the following expression:
F W(KtA+) (2 ) -6[_A + (1_-a)] AF(K = 1 (2.23)F'(-..t+,)(2 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~(2.23)
The interpretation of this expression is a little involved. It can be separated in two parts:
F'(KA)(1-4;) is the marginal effect on -Aa caused by the contemporaneous effects of upheaval:
if there is no revolt, supporters enjoy the whole return from infrastructure, while subversion
reduces it to a fraction 4. F'(KA) - 6[qA + (1- yA)/]F'(§KA) is the effect on TAa caused by
the effect of upheaval on next period's returns: if there is no subversion, citizens will receive
the full return per period, F(KA) while ousting the leader has two effects. First, it will reduce
the stock of capital tomorrow to KA, because of the absence of investment today. Second, the
citizens enter on the lottery for the replacement, which means that their expected enjoyment is
scaled down by [A + (1 - A)/]. Note that the equivalent expression for a social planner that
would take the welfare of both groups into account would be:
[rA + (1 - 7rA)]F(KtA+) = -
A comparison of both expressions gives a sense of which parameter values will make the
level of capital under the ruler diverge most from the social optimum. First, the right hand
side of both conditions is equal: marginal costs are the same for both the social planner and
the ruler, and obviously, costs increase with depreciation.
Second, the left hand side of (2.23) implies that the leader will invest more in capital the
faster the good depreciates and the less useful it is during upheaval. That is, her investment is
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decreasing"' in § and Q. These two forces are ignored by the social planner42. There are political
reasons behind these effects: reduction in and/or increases the costs of subverting the
authority of the leader. In particular, one of the costs of upheaval is the absence of investment
for one period, because the state stops working. Obviously, this is not a large cost if depreciation
is very slow and, as a consequence, investment is very small each period. On the contrary, when
§ approaches 0, K behaves very similarly to 7, and it has been shown above that in this case
there is overspending in patronage. The reason for investment to decrease with V) is exactly the
same.
Third, excludability () features in both expressions with contrary effect. When supporters
know that they can be easily excluded from enjoying public capital if there is a change in the
leadership, they are more eager to defend the current regime. Hence an increase in : reduces
investment by the leader. For the social planner, investment is increasing in 3 because more
people are able to enjoy the public infrastucture and social welfare increases while costs remain
the same.
Assuming that F(K) = K, for a < 1, allows an explicit look at the gap between the capital
level of the leader and the socially optimal level. Denote by kA the level chosen by the ruler
and by K* the level chosen by the social planner. The ratio of both expressions satisfies:
KA ___ 2- -5[_y A + (1 _-yA)3]_
K* -= WA + (1- A)
Note that this ratio is decreasing in , V) and . The intuitions have been explained above.
Note that when /3 = = = 1, the relative level of capital provided by the leader is very low,
because is close to 1.
The absence of investment in infrastructure can thus be interpreted under the light of the
model. The political survival of the leader hinges on creating a network of supporters personally
dependent on her presence in power. Building a road gives no advantage to the leader, because
the day a coup ousts her from power the road will still be there for everybody to enjoy. The
same is true for a hospital or a school. Hence there is underprovision of capital when it is very
4 1 As long as §F'(§K) is increasing in .
42Obviously, if the good depreciates faster any investor would invest less in it, but this effect is present in the
right hand side of both expressions.
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permanent, it is not excludable and/or does not lose usefulness during periods of upheaval. At
the other extreme of the parameter space, there is overprovision of capital. This is why the
leader favors expenditures in wages and reduces infrastructure construction4 3.
2.5.2 On Patterns of Ethnic Violence
The logic of the model can be extended to show that another way the leader can enlist the
support of her ethnic group is by making sure that ethnic supporters disproportionately fear
the prospect of being under the rule of another group. The ruler can contribute to this fear
by acting heavy-handedly against oppressed groups, and making sure that her rule is seen by
everyone as ethnically based rule. Ayittey (1999) describes how ordinary Krahn people feared
the demise of Samuel K. Doe, a fellow Krahn, in Liberia. Even though they did not receive any
of the spoils from government, the fact that the regime was clearly almost exclusively Krahn,
and that it was engaged in acts of pillaging, rape and atrocities against the other groups made
clear to them that retribution would be against all Krahn the day the regime was defeated.
Obviously, this made Krahn people collaborate in defending the regime, even in the absence of
any spoil from the government. Hence, ethnic violence can be used to enlist otherwise reluctant
members of the group in the defense the regime.
To see how the prospect of violence is equivalent to patronage links to the ruler the model
can be extended in a very simple way. Assume that by oppressing the excluded group, the leader
can contribute to the level of enmity that the excluded group holds against the supporter group.
Call EtA B the level of enmity that group B has against A. Assume that this variable evolves in
the following way EAB AB .+ oAB, where oABdenotes the amount of costly oppression that
--- q)E-1 't-i, 
LA inflicts over B citizens. Assume further that living under the leadership of a group that
stocks enmity against you causes disutility because of revenge, which is captured by II(EAB),
with II' > 0, II" < 0, and 11(0) = 0.
Now, if supporters don't subvert, st = 0, they will receive44 :
43This argument for the existence of inefficient clientelist networks based on "flow" goods such as expanded
public employment versus "stock" goods such as infrastructure is examined explicitly in Robinson and Verdier
(2002). They develop other comparative statics, but the framework presented here explicitly links the appearance
of these networks with the weak institutions and ethnic divisions present in Africa.
44Again, for simplicity the case shown assumes ;A = B = 
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oA _ Aa + R(r7AA) + 6VA(A)
If they replace the leader, st = 1, they will receive:
£A E1_ y+{ A(wA TAa + R(,]A)) + (1 - YA)(WA A- Ba i(EB))}
Hence, the support constraint can be written as:
TA a R(T A A ) (1 _ yA) t+l 6 S(_Aa + R(7]A ) TBa + II(EAB)) (2.24)
Therefore, the leader maximizes 1 t{lrA (Ta - 4A) ± ( -{A)T(b -A (E+-EB)} under
the usual no-switching constraints and (2.24). The optimal level of enmity that LA seeks (as
in the previous subsection she will jump right away to this level because of linear utility) is
determined by:
-1 -q$E=t+J(6°)s 'l(XE*B)) -  VS= ~ ~ ~ ~~1-A
This expression shows that the leader will cause a higher level of enmity the slower enmity
disappears (the higher 0), the smaller the time discounting (the higher ) and the bigger the
chance that; the supporters will lose control of power should they replace the leader (the lower
_yA). The intuition is perfectly in line with the rest of the argument developed in the paper:
VA(B) is smaller the slower the rate of forgiveness. Moreover, VA(B) is more probable when
1 - yA is small. Both effects make her supporters warier of entering into the replacement lottery
and this allows the ruler to extract more resources.
To see that enmity behaves similarly to the capacity to discriminate in patronage, rename
AAB = (1 YA)-7 16slH(qsEAB). With this change of notation the model can be solved for the
unique MPE which has the following expression for taxes extracted from the supporter group:
Aa _ (1 + (B)(AoA + ( BAoB
_ ~~~+
1 ( A + ( B
(1 + B) A ABA + (1 + CB)AAB + ( + CA)(l + B)R(VA) + (A(1 + (B)R(7,B)
1 A +B
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where (A = (1 _ A)-6- and =B (1 -_ yB)i5. Note that in this expression, the capacity
to induce enmity enhances the capacity to steal in a similar way as the ability to discriminate
in patronage. Kleptocracy can thus be supported by indiscriminate use of violence in the name
of the group, as Samuel K. Doe's Liberia show.
This logic can be used to understand the scale of atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda
in 1994. Prunier (1995) describes how the "hutu" regime of Habyarimana and the inner circle
captained by his wife was besieged both by the Tutsi guerrillas of the RPF and the southern
moderate hutu elites that were complaining at the level of corruption and kleptocracy concen-
trated in northern hands. By making the majority of the hutu population participate in the
atrocities, the regime almost succeeded in doing two things. First they completely erased the
northern-southern divide inside the hutu elites by either eliminating those hutus deemed too
moderate or making them participate in the genocide. Second, the scale of atrocities against
the tutsi minority was so horrific, that no hutu could accept the prospect of living under a tutsi
leader for fear of equally horrible retribution. The massive scale of hutu refugee tides to Zaire
is a testament to this strategy. This pattern of government sponsored ethnic violence, albeit
in a somewhat smaller scale has been present in Uganda, Burundi45 and other countries in the
region.
Post-colonial rulers have not been the first ones in using these strategies in Africa. Multiple
academic accounts, among them Cooper (2002) and Horowitz (1985) describe the process by
which ethnic separation became a basic strategy of domination by the colonial powers. Some
groups where protected and allowed to thrive but at the same time they were demonised among
the rest of the population. In reality, political reasons were paramount in deciding whether
nilotes were good for the army in Uganda and baganda were good for civil service. This process
generated a basis of support for colonial presence but contributed dramatically to the creation
of ethnic self-consciousness and resentment. These societies were, as a consequence, ripe for
the exploitation of such divisions by their post-colonial leaders.
The logic of exclusion and replacement thus provides as a corollary a framework to under-
stand some of the patterns of high and low level ethnic violence that plague deeply divided
societies, especially when their governments define themselves in ethnic terms.
45See Lemarchand (1996) for an account of the seeds of violence and patterns of ethnic domination in Burundi.
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2.6 Conclusion
Post-colonial African leaders have provided very bad outcomes to their populations. These have
been the result of flagrant abuse of power to impose distortionary and rent-creating policies on
their economies. Moreover, these rents have been dissipated at the very top of the leadership,
and some countries have been governed by outright kleptocracies. Nonetheless, accounts coin-
cide in considering these regimes weak, which sheds doubt on the hypothesis that they have
survived in power solely thanks to the use of force to oppress the whole population.
This paper advances a different explanation for such blatant absence of political account-
ability: weak institutions have allowed leaders to exploit ethnic divisions. In particular, the
use of patronage networks allow the leader to treat her ethnic group better than the opposition
and this makes ethnic supporters keen in maintaining this relative superiority. In a system of
personal rule, replacing the ruler will be accompanied by upheaval and in such circumstances
the current; opposition could take control of the state. This combination makes supporters
reluctant to replace the leader and hence rents are not dissipated. In fact, the ruler is able to
extract resources from all groups in society. From the analysis I derive a number of corollaries
that relate the amount of funds diverted by the leader to the structure of the economy and the
quality of institutions.
Obviously, there are a number of factors contributing to this absence of accountability that
have been left out of the stylized model. Here I name some of them, for further research. First, a
particularly interesting factor is the collective action problem. Ousting a leader that governs in
a personal rule regime probably entails activities that imply personal risk. Since the benefit of
replacing the leader is collective, it is obvious that there is scope for free-riding. I did not include
this element in the model because I wanted to show that even in the absence of collective action
problems these leaders are able to establish kleptocracies in deeply divided societies, but there
is no doubt that there is a lot to be learnt from an explicit analysis. In particular, oppression
of the press has been a typical feature of these regimes. If there is a collective action problem,
not allowing the press to report freely can contribute to make coordination matters even worse.
Second, it would be interesting to model explicitly the dual role of violence in my argument.
First, it keeps a sizable share of the population in the excluded status and second, it prevents the
emergence of any potential leader among the supporter group. These two patterns of violence
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seem, for theoretical as well as empirical reasons, quite different and an explicit model may
show, for example, why these regimes have kept the military weak while at the same time have
used ethnic militias as a close, albeit difficult to control, substitute.
Third, the model assumes a society divided in the most trivial way: two groups. Adding
more groups may offer some insights on the type of ethnic dictatorship that will emerge. It
would be interesting to see if the existence of "pivotal" groups makes kleptocracy a less viable
alternative, even though the empirical evidence does not seem to support this hypothesis. Is
there an ethnic configuration of society that is differentially conducive to abusive rule?
Fourth and common with the majority of models that treat ethnic groups as given, the
insight offered begs the constructivist critique: would this conclusion hold if we allowed groups
to be generated endogenously by the action of ethnic elites? I would argue that not only the
conclusion would be robust, but that we would actually observe these leaders trying to create
or activate cleavages in society, following the lines of the colonizers. However, this process is
not modeled explicitly and from such an engagement other lessons may be learnt.
The main lesson from the growing field of analysis of policy determinants in weakly in-
stitutionalized regimes is that their inefficiencies emerge because weak states impose a very
particular set of contraints and needs on their rulers. The same is true for the political out-
comes of such countries. Attempts at helping these economies have to take into account where
the incentives of their leaders are (mis)placed. In particular, given the absence of accountability
highlighted here, it is not surprising that enormous amounts of foreign aid have passed unno-
ticed through African economies to end up stashed in Swiss bank accounts. This paper is an
attempt to offer a theoretical foundation for those who insist that serious institutional reform
has to be attempted to improve the plight of African citizens.
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2.7 Appendix 1: Proof to Proposition 2
First, note that a finite horizon version of the game will have a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium (SPE): there are no simultaneous moves in the tree and instances of indifference are
the result of the usual open set argument. Hence the generically unique SPE can be found by
backwards induction.
Denote by VfAA the present discounted utility of the unique SPE for citizen A if the game
starts with a leader LA and the stage game is repeated T times. V A B, V B B and V B A are
defined equivalently.
Assume, without loss of generality that the game ends with a leader LA. It is very easy to
see that in the final stage of the game, in the unique SPE, the leader offers the following policy
vector: {TAA, T B , AA, B} = {R( 7TA), R(T]A)+OB, A, 0}, where rA is such that R'(r/A) = 7 A .
In this fashion the leader is providing utility wA to her supporters while optimally stealing from
group B. The reason why she cannot reduce her supporters' utility is that there is no future and
hence she would be replaced if her proposed policy induced a reduction in citizens' A utility. As
a consequence, the leader is not replaced in the last period (her supporters are indifferent) and
she earns some positive rents. Hence, the unique SPE of any finite horizon game will have the
same properties as the MPE of Proposition 1: the leader never loses support and she steals to
the point that her supporters are indifferent. Specifically, at each stage, the leader maximizes:
T
max Z 6 t-l[TA(T- Aa - 7rAA) + (1- lA)(TAb - rAB)]{TAa,rAb AA ,4'B } t=
subj.to rAb < oB + Aa [A] (2.25)
FAa < oA + Ab [v] (2.26)
VAA Ž iA± -m-A + +6(1 A)vT 1 [1] (2.27)
0 < r/t [P] (2.28)
Constraints (2.25) and (2.26) are the usual no-switching constrains, while constraint (2.27)
is the non-stationary finite horizon no-subversion constraint. In particular, the left hand side
is the utility the supporters receive if they do not subvert (that is, they play the equilibrium
strategy for a game of length T) and the right hand side is the expected utility of subverting: no
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state interference today and the lottery between leaders from tomorrow onwards which provides
exactly the same utility as a game of length T - 1.
The solution to this program yields that (2.25), (2.27) and (2.28) are binding at every t.
State the definition of the present discounted utility in equilibrium:
V~rA ~A ATja qA TrA ATVA A _ W A - Tf a + R( A ) + 67A vTAA1 + (1 - A vTA 1
VAB wB TAb 6+ AVTAB + ( 1 - yA)VTBB
By substracting the second equation from the first and using (2.25) as binding, one obtains
an equation in differences:
vAA _ VAB = WA _ B o+ B + R(A) + A(VTAA - VAB) 6(1 - A)(VTBB -V 1 )
VT -- T--I T-1J -- - --
Note that the same equation can be written in a symmetric fashion from the point of view
of LB. Now, denote VTAA - VTB and TB = VB - VTA. The two version of the previous
equation can be written as a system in differences:
{E)A T ( .A 6(1- A) (A (WA - A--B + B R( ± )rO~~~~~~~~~~~T n= 
BJ V -6(1- B) B J KOBJ wB WA + A + R(B)
The two eigenvalues of the transition matrix of this system are 6 and 6 (~A + jB _ 1) hence both
are smaller than in absolute value. As a consequence the system converges to a well defined
eA (E)
Using the definition of EA and E0, the system formed by (2.27) and the equivalent restric-
tion from the problem of LB, taken as binding, can be written as:
vAA wA + T-A + 6(1 - A)VTBB -6(1- YA)eTB 1
VBB B + yBVB + 6(1 - B)VTAA -6(1- YA)EAi
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Which can be rewritten as a dynamic system:
( VTA A 6( _A -(1 - _yA) B 
+ (2.29)
VBB 6(1 - B) 7 B VTB1 B - 6(1 _ B)A
(2.29) is the general expression for the payoffs of a game of length T, starting the iteration with
V1AA = wA and BB = wB The eigenvalues of this transition matrix are and 6(yA +yB - 1)
and hence they are both smaller than 1. Since the autonomous additive term converges, it is
easy, but very tedious to show, that the payoffs converge to the invariant vector of this mapping
with EO and oA. The expression for the invariant vector is thus:
V A 1 _ 6YA _6(- _ 1A) wA_6(1 _yA)OB )
VVB*- _(l _ -YB) 1 _ yB B - (1 - yB)eA
After some lengthy algebra, it turns out that:
( AA __ c, 
V 1 1- B
(1 -B) A +(1 -- jA (1 _ A)( 4pB _- A - R(rB))
(1 - )(1 + (1 -;;yA - ayB)) (I - pyA)uIB + 3(1 - aB)(.A _ 0B _ R(r))J
Which are exactly the payoffs for the unique MPE of the infinite horizon game presented in
Proposition 1.
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2.8 Appendix 2: Comparative Statics
The expressions for the comparative statics of ~A with respect to the institutional parameters
depend on the following partial derivatives:
__A (1 + kB)2(QA + R(r]BB)) + (1 + pB)pB(oB + R(iAA)) 0
A [1 + ,A + B]2
aOA A(oA + R(BB)) + (1 + A)A(oB + R( 1AA)) > 0
a A _ 6(1 - 5 ,B) + a2(1 - A) > 
-;A [1 + (1 - A _ B)]2
aT A 6
07-4 1 + (1 - A _ B)
a A 62(.A _ YA)
2>0C [1 + (1 -A _ B)]2 
a'TA
= 0
ax B 62(yB _ B )
= _~- >O)
= 0 -
_
B
_ (1 _& )+ 2(1 - yB)
>0
_,_
B [1 (1 -- -,A yB)]2
OkrA 5
< 0
a0yA I + (1j A B
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Chapter 3
Legislative Effectiveness and
Legislative Careers1
3.1 Introduction
Good laws do not make themselves. They require inputs of time, energy, information, and
thought. Holding hearings, drafting bills, amending bills, building coalitions, and investigating
executive implementation are necessary parts of the process. Who does this work in U.S.
legislatures? Which legislators are especially effective at the job of lawmaking? What are the
determinants of effectiveness? Do legislators become more effective with experience, through
learning-by-doing or by investing in specific human capital?
Viewed as a law-producing organization, an efficient legislature would allocate talent to
where it is needed and productive. It would also employ incentive schemes that reward lawmak-
ers who are diligent, skilled, and effective. In addition, voters would play a role, by rewarding
effective legislators with reelection. If experience is an important component of legislative effec-
tiveness, then reelection is important to permit legislators to gain experience. How efficient are
U.S. legislatures in these terms? Do more effective legislators win reelection more often? Do
they rise more quickly to positions of power inside legislatures? What is the relative importance
of effectiveness and other factors, such as seniority or party loyalty?
This chapter is the result of joint work with Professor James M. Snyder.
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We know little about the answers to these questions, in large part because we lack mea-
sures of the relative diligence, skill, or effectiveness of politicians. This paper exploits data on
legislator "effectiveness" for the North Carolina House of Representatives for the period 1977-
2001, collected by the North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research (NC Center). The
NC Center surveys about 500 legislators, lobbyists, and journalists at the end of each "long"
legislative session, and asks them to assess how effective each legislator was during that session.2
The respondents were asked to order legislators according to their work in committees and on
the floor, their general knowledge and expertise in special fields, their ability to influence the
opinion of fellow legislators, and their general aptitude for the legislative process. The measure
is probably the best available for any U.S. legislature. 3
We view effectiveness as the product of three factors: (i) the intrinsic aptitude of a legislator,
(ii) on-the-job learning or investing in specific legislative skills, and (iii) institutional positions a
legislator holds, such as committee or party leadership positions, or membership in the majority
party.4 Much of our analysis attempts to estimate the relative importance of each of the three
factors.
Our findings are as follows. First, legislators who hold positions of power - committee chairs,
vice-chairs and subcommittee chairs on the most important committees, chamber leadership
posts, etc. - are more effective than those who do not. Second, members of the majority party
are, on average, more effective than those in the minority.
Third, effectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms, even after
controlling for legislators' institutional positions, party affiliation, and other factors. There is
2The NC state legislature has biennial regular sessions. These "long" sessions convene in January following
each election. In addition, there have been special "short" sessions in virtually every even-numbered year since
1974.
3In 1992, State Policy Reports wrote: "Most attempts at reputational rankings of state legislators don't
deserve much credibility because of three problems: (1) no precise definition of who is being polled, (2) a low
response rate among those polled because legislators and lobbyists don't want to risk getting caught making
statements suggesting people they work with are ineffective, or (3) definitions of effectiveness that equate effec-
tiveness with helping to enact an interest group's agenda... Over the years, Reports has seen many of these...
that fail one or another of these tests. The exception is the rankings that have been done since 1978 by the
North Carolina Center." In 1996, Governing magazine (published by Congressional Quarterly, Inc.) wrote: "The
ratings issued by the North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research are perhaps the most straightforward
and most widely respected." Rankings or partial rankings are available for some other states as well, including
Arkansas, California, Florida, Texas, and Washington.
4We use the term aptitude broadly, to include not only abilities but also preferences. Some people enjoy
legislative work and are willing to work hard at it, while others do not.
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no evidence that effectiveness eventually declines with tenure, even out to nine terms. The
impact of legislative experience on effectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition and
selective retirement, with higher-quality legislators being more likely to win reelection. Rather,
the results suggest that the increased effectiveness is due to the acquisition of specific human
capital, most likely through learning-by-doing.
Fourth, legislators who are more effective in their first term in office - arguably, a good
measure of the aptitude for legislative work - are promoted more quickly to powerful positions
in the chamber and in important committees. This indicates that positive sorting occurs, which
is what we would expect in an efficient legislature.
Finally, effectiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral success. Legislators who
are more effective are less likely to be challenged and more likely to win reelection. They are
also more likely to seek higher office, and more likely to win such office conditional on seeking
it. Higher effectiveness also reduces the probability of retirement.
These findings have important implications for term limits, the incumbency advantage,
seniority rule, and political accountability. We discuss these implications in section 8.
Before proceeding, we must acknowledge two limitations of the study. First, the analysis is
limited to one state, so we must be cautious in drawing general conclusions about legislatures
outside of North Carolina. Many of our findings are consistent with those of others studies,
however, so we are willing to speculate about their broader implications. Second, although the
effectiveness data for North Carolina is probably the best available for any legislature in the
U.S., it is still based on subjective evaluations. More objective measures are clearly desirable.
Unfortunately, the existing measures - such as those based on counts of bill activity, amendment
activity or attendance - capture only a small part of effectiveness. One way to proceed in such
a situation is to identify the relationships found using different measures, then focus on those
that appear in study after study. Our paper could then be viewed as one small part of this
broader enterprise.
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3.2 Related Literature
As noted above, relatively little research has been done on the determinants or effects of indi-
vidual legislator performance. There are, however, some notable exceptions.
Several papers use bill introduction and amendment activity to measure performance.
Wawro (2000) uses sponsorship and co-sponsorship to construct "entrepreneurship" scores for
all U.S. House members serving in the 94th-103rd Congresses. He finds that higher levels of
entrepreneurial activity help Democratic representatives advance into leadership positions, but
there is no effect for Republicans. Entrepreneurship does not appear to have a significant im-
pact on voters' evaluations or vote choices. Schiller (1995) also uses bill sponsorship to measure
entrepreneurship, and studies the U.S. Senate during the 99th and 100th Congresses. She finds
that senior senators sponsor more bills than junior members, as do senators who hold commit-
tee chairs or are chairs of a large number of subcommittees. Hamm et. al. (1983) find that
leadership positions and seniority are strong predictors of legislative activity and bill success in
the Texas and South Carolina state legislatures.
Other studies employ subjective measures of performance, or a mix of subjective and ob-
jective measures. One of the earliest is Francis (1962), who studies several determinants of
"influence" in the Indiana state senate. More recently, Mayhew (2000) studies "prominent"
actions taken by members of the U.S. Congress over a 200-year period. He finds that in recent
decades legislators tend to have a large amount of experience - or at least seniority - before they
take prominent legislative actions. DeGregorio (1997) surveyed 97 professional interest group
advocates, and asked them to identify congressional "leaders" on six key bills passed during
the 100th Congress. She reports that tenure, majority party status, holding a party leadership
position, and membership on policy-relevant committees were significant predictors of whether
a representative was identified as a leader. Luttbeg (1992) studies journalists' rankings of leg-
islators in several states, and finds that legislators with the highest rankings have a 12% higher
probability of reelection than those with the lowest rankings. Meyer (1980) surveyed state rep-
resentatives in North Carolina in 1973 to estimate the determinants of the "most influential"
members.
Mondak (1995c) and Mondak and McCurley (1995) derive measures of "integrity," "com-
petence" and "quality" from content analysis of the descriptions of U.S. House members in the
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Almanac of American Politics and Politics in America. Mondak (1995c) finds that low-quality
incumbents are more likely to leave congress after a few terms, via voluntary retirement or elec-
toral defeat. Quality also affects the level of challenger spending and vote-margins in primary
elections. These effects seem to be driven more by competence than integrity. McCurley and
Mondak (1995) focus on the link between incumbent quality and voters' opinions as revealed
in the National Election Studies. They find that incumbent integrity directly influences both
feeling thermometer scores and voting choices, while competence affects elections indirectly via
the behavior of potential challengers.
Finally. two papers study North Carolina and use legislator effectiveness data from the
NC Center. Weissert (1991) focuses on issue specialization, and finds that legislators who
introduce bills on "salient" issues are rated as more effective than other legislators. Haynie
(2002) focuses on racial discrimination, and finds evidence that black legislators are viewed as
less effective than white legislators even after controlling for other factors. Both papers also
find that effectiveness increases with seniority, and that it is higher for members who hold
committee chairs or chamber leadership positions, for members of the majority party, and for
members who introduce more bills. Lawyers also appear to be more effective.
Our results add to this literature in several ways. We have much more data on legislator
performance than any of the studies above except Wawro (2000), Weissert (1991), and Haynie
(2002). Our data also do not suffer as severely from potential sample selection issues as the data
of Mondak and associates, since we have data on all legislators. 5 Perhaps most importantly, we
are able to follow legislators for many terms and study the dynamics of their legislative careers.
Only Wawro (2000) conducts any dynamic analyses similar to ours below. This is mainly due
to data limitations, of course - e.g., DeGregorio (1997) only has a snapshot of one congress,
and Mondak (1995c) and McCurley and Mondak (1995) cannot construct a meaningful panel
of congressional competence or integrity indices.
5They are able to assign scores on one or both attributes to 75% of the relevant sample (403 out of nearly 550).
The missing congressmen are those for which neither the Almanac of American Politics nor Politics in America
provided sufficiently detailed information. This is almost certainly a non-random subsample of individuals.
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3.3 Data and Sources
As noted above, we study the North Carolina state legislature because it probably has the best
available data on legislator effectiveness of any U.S. legislature.
3.3.1 A Bit of Background
The North Carolina legislature is called the General Assembly. It consists of two chambers, a
House of Representatives with 120 members and a Senate with 50 members. All members are
elected every two years for two-year terms. The General Assembly is typically described a hybrid
- an amateur, citizens' legislature with some professional characteristics. Regular legislative
sessions are biennial, convening in January following each election. In addition, there have been
special sessions or short sessions in virtually every even-numbered year since 1974. In 1986-88
the North Carolina legislature was ranked 22nd in terms of legislative professionalism, and in
1994-1996 it was ranked 28th (Squire, 1992, 2000). In 2001 legislative salaries were $13,951
plus a $104 per diem for living expenses. Legislative leaders earned substantially more - e.g.,
the Speaker of the House received a salary of $38,151 and an expense allowance of $16,956.6
The Democratic Party dominated the North Carolina General Assembly until very recently.
Democrats held 86% of all state legislative seats during the period 1970-1979, 77% during
1980-1989, and 61% during 1990-1999. In 1994 Republicans won control of the state House for
the first time in 100 years. They won again in 1996, but then lost in 1998.7 Internally, the
legislature is organized mainly along party lines. The majority party controls all committee
chairs, but some vice-chairs and subcommittee chairs go to the minority. Electorally, party
organizations in North Carolina are stronger than in most other southern states, but typically
rank just below the U.S. average (see, e.g., Cotter et al. (1984)). Morehouse (1981) classified
North Carolina as a state in which pressure groups are strong.
6 Despite its character as a citizens' legislature, some observers argue that until recently the North Carolina
General Assembly was one of the most powerful legislative bodies in the nation. This is due to the fact that
until 1996 the governor of North Carolina had no veto.
7The 2002 elections produced an exact 50-50 split in the House, resulting in a unique system of shared control.
Democrats controlled the state Senate throughout the period under study, but with a narrow 26-24 margin during
1995-1996.
106
3.3.2 Measuring Legislator Effectiveness
The data on legislator effectiveness comes from the North Carolina Center for Public Policy
Research (NC Center), an independent non-partisan organization.8 At the end of each regular
legislative session after the legislature has adjourned, the NC Center asks state legislators,
lobbyists and legislative liaisons, and capital news correspondents to rate the "effectiveness" of
each member of the General Assembly. According to the NC Center:
Ratings were to be based on their participation in committee work, their skill at
guiding bills through floor debate, their general knowledge and expertise in special
fields, the respect they command from their peers, the enthusiasm with which they
execute various legislative responsibilities, the political power they hold (either by
virtue of office, longevity, or personal attributes), their ability to sway the opinion
of fellow legislators, and their aptitude for the overall legislative process. (From
Article II: A Guide to the 1991-1992 N.C. Legislature, p. 212.)
The NC Center has conducted this survey continuously since 1977. The sample includes
all 170 legislators, all lobbyists registered in the state capital who reside in North Carolina
(250-325 lobbyists), and all journalists who regularly cover the state General Assembly (35-45
journalists), for a total sample size of 475-550.9 The NC Center publishes a ranking based on
these ratings in its biennial handbooks, Article II: A Guide to the N.C. Legislature.
We focus on the North Carolina House of Representatives because it is larger. As noted
above, this chamber has 120 members. Our main variable of interest is the effectiveness ranking
of each representative in each session. A good descriptive title for this variable might be
"Relative Legislative Performance," but we use the shorter term Effectiveness in the text and
tables below. We "invert" the ranking so that higher values mean greater effectiveness - thus,
the highest ranked legislator in each session receives an Effectiveness value of 120, and the
8The NC Center was created in 1977. It is "an independent, nonprofit organization dedicated to the
goals of a better-informed public and more effective, accountable, and responsive government" (see the URL:
http://www.Lnccppr.org/mission.html\#mission).
9Response rates were only about 33% for the period 1977-1981, but have been over 50% since
1985. For more information see the North Carolina Political Review's August 2002 interview with
Ran Coble, executive director of the NC Center. The text of the interview can be found at URL:
http://www.ncpoliticalreview.com/0702/coblel.htm.
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lowest ranked legislator receives a value of 1.10
Some of our analyses use the effectiveness rankings legislators receive at the end of their
first term of service. As noted above, this might serve as a measure of a legislator's general
aptitude for legislative work. We call this Effectiveness 1.
As noted above, the main weakness of the Effectiveness rankings is that they are based on
subjective evaluations. This disadvantage is offset by several desirable characteristics: Each
ranking is based on a large number of evaluations; the evaluators are all legislative "specialists"
of one sort or another; and the rankings are constructed in a consistent manner over a long
period of time.
Two other facts about the rankings are encouraging. First, between 1977 and 1992 the
NC Center reported the average evaluation that each representative received from each of the
three types of respondents - legislators, lobbyists, and journalists - in addition to the overall
evaluation and ranking. The correlations across the three separate scores are quite high: the
correlation between the average rating by legislators and the average rating by lobbyists is .93,
the correlation between the average rating by legislators and the average rating by journalists
is .89, and the correlation between the average rating by lobbyists and the average rating by
journalists is .91. Thus, various biases that we might imagine in the responses - e.g., lobbyists
might systematically underrate legislators who oppose their positions, and legislators might
systematically underrate members of the opposing party - do not appear to be a problem.
Second, the NC Center's Article II guides also contain information on the number of bills
each member introduced, and how many of these became law. For representatives serving during
the period 1981-2000, the correlation between Effectiveness and the number of bills introduced
is .51, and the correlation between Effectiveness and the number of bills ratified is .50. Thus,
the more objective measures of activity are strongly and positively related to Effectiveness. On
the other hand, the correlation is far from 1, indicating that Effectiveness measures something
other than simply introducing and passing bills.
l°The ranking reported by the NC Center is constructed as follows: Let E1 be the average evaluation a
legislator receives from legislators, let E2 be the average evaluation the legislator receives from lobbyists, let E3
be the average evaluation a legislator receives from journalists, and let E = (E1 + E2 + E3)/3. Legislators are
ranked according to the E's. Thus, the three groups of respondents - legislators, lobbyists, and journalists - are
weighted equally.
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Another issue is that Effectiveness is an ordinal variable, so attenuation bias may be a
concern. Of course, this bias generally makes it more difficult to find statistically significant
relationships, so we are not concerned that it introduces spurious correlations. Pooling the
ordinal data across years could exacerbate the problem further. To address this, we include
year-specific fixed effects in all analyses. We also include member-specific fixed member-specific
effects in most of our analyses - thus, our identification is based mainly on changes in members'
rankings over time. In addition, for a subset of years we can use the "raw" average effectiveness
evaluations rather than rankings. These probably suffer less from the problems associated with
ordinal data. Using the raw evaluations, we obtain qualitatively similar results to those reported
below.
3.3.3 Other Variables
Our analyses require other measures as well, including election outcomes and contestation rates,
party affiliations, committee assignments and leadership posts, legislative tenure, and roll call
voting records. These variables are all described in Table A.1, with summary statistics given
in Table A.2.
Data on committee assignments, leadership posts, and tenure are from the NC Center's Ar-
ticle II guides and from various editions of the North Carolina Manual. These books contains a
complete list of each legislator's committee assignments and major subcommittee assignments,
including information about whether the member served as chairman, co-chairman, vice chair-
man, or ranking member. In addition, the NC Center's survey provides information about the
relative importance of different committees. Each respondent was asked to name the five or
six "most powerful" committees in both houses. The most powerful committees almost always
included Appropriations, Finance, Judiciary I, and Rules, and Education from 1989 onward. 1
We construct the variable Chamber Leader to indicate legislators who held one of the fol-
lowing positions: Speaker of the House, Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Deputy Speaker of
the House, Majority Whip, and Minority Whip. We also construct several committee leader-
ship variables, including Chair of Power Committee, Leader of Power Committee, and Chair of
1'Other committees appeared on the list in particular years - e.g., Judiciary III in 1983 and Judiciary IV in
2001. In 1991, a redistricting year, the Redistricting committees were among the top six. Respondents were also
asked to name the "most influential" lobbyists.
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Other Committee. We define Tenure as the number of terms a legislator has served continuously
in the state House, including the present term. We also define several dummy variables: Tenure
1 = 1 for freshman, Tenure 2 = for sophomores, and so on. We employ two party variables,
Democrat and Majority Party. Democrats controlled the House from 1979-1994 and again from
1999-2000, but the Republicans controlled it during the period 1995-1998. In some specifica-
tions we include certain personal characteristics of members: Age, Age at Entry, Lawyer, and
Previous Service. This information was collected from various editions of the North Carolina
Manual.
In order to estimate the impact of effectiveness on election outcomes, we must control for the
"normal vote" in each legislative district (Converse, 1966). We use the votes cast in statewide
offices to estimate the Normal Vote. Due to redistricting we have three different sets of districts,
and due to data limitations we use three slightly different sets of statewide offices for the three
periods.12
Finally, to measure election outcomes we collected general election data on all candidates
running for the North Carolina General Assembly during the period 1976-2000. We obtained
this data from ICPSR Study Number 8907, and from the official election results published by
the North Carolina State Board of Elections. We used this data to construct several measures,
including Uncontested, and Reelected. We also found all cases where a state representative ran
for a statewide office, the U.S. Congress, or the state senate, and created the variable Sought
Higher Office.13
'
2For 1978-1980 we calculate the average Democratic share of the two-party vote for governor, senator, and
president, using county-level data. (Prior to 1982, no counties were split across state house districts, but larger
counties elected all their state legislators at-large.) The data are from ICPSR Study Number 13. For 1982-1990
we calculate the average Democratic share of the two-party vote for all available statewide races held during
the period 1984-1990. These offices are: U.S. Senator, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State,
Treasurer, Auditor, Attorney General, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner
of Labor, and Superintendent of Public Instruction. Due to a redistricting between the 1982 and 1984 elections,
we can only estimate the Normal Vote for 87% of the 1982 House districts. There was yet another redistricting
in 1985, but in this case the court simply ordered the merging of three House districts into a single district.
We aggregated precinct-level data to the legislative district level; the precinct-level data are from the Record
of American Democracy (ROAD) database. For 1992-2000 we calculate the average Democratic share of the
two-party vote for all statewide elected offices in the 2000 election. Again, we aggregated precinct-level data to
the legislative district level; the precinct-level data are from the North Carolina State Board of Elections (URL:
http://www.sboe.state.nc.us).
13 We obtained some of this data in reports from the NC State Board of Elections and the NC State Legislative
Library, and we extracted some from the URL: http://www.sboe.state.nc.us.
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3.4 The Determinants of Average Effectiveness
We begin by studying the determinants of average Effectiveness in the legislature. Since we
observe most legislators for two or more terms, the data have a panel structure. We exploit
this by estimating fixed effects and random effects models, with an individual effect for each
legislator. The panel is unbalanced, however, so it must be treated with some care. We address
this in more detail in section 5.
From a theoretical point of view, we consider Effectiveness as the relative "output" of a rep-
resentative during a term. The production function used to generate this output employs three
conceptually different factors. The first factor is a member's intrinsic capability or aptitude
for legislative work. The main way we capture this is by using legislator-specific fixed effects.
Alternatively, in some specifications we use random effects and also include measures of some
of the characteristics that common sense or previous research suggests should affect ability, in-
cluding occupation, age, and prior service. The second factor is a member's portfolio of formal
leadership positions in the legislature. Party leaders, committee chairs and vice-chairs, sub-
committee chairs, and members of the most powerful committees are likely to be more effective
at passing and blocking legislation than other legislators. Members of the majority party may
also have an advantage in building winning coalitions for their proposals. The third factor is
experience, which should affect performance through learning-by-doing or investment in skills
and knowledge specific to the legislature.
In Table 1 we attempt to isolate the effects of these three sets of variables. The table reports
regression results with Effectiveness as the dependent variable for various sub-samples. The
first two columns pool all representatives present in the House from 1977 to 2001. Columns
3-6 compare the parties' delegations. Columns 1, 3 and 5 present fixed effects estimates, and
columns 2, 4 and 6 contain random effects estimates. The Hausman specification tests typically
reject the null hypothesis that the individual effects are orthogonal to the regressors. We report
the random effects results nonetheless, because they allow us to gauge the impact of individual
characteristics that are time invariant. The fact that the coefficients do not vary much between
the specifications gives us some confidence that the random effects estimates are meaningful.
Not surprisingly, legislators who hold the top leadership posts - chamber leaders and chairs
of the five most powerful committees - tend to be rated among the most effective. These posts
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are worth about 12-16 positions on the ranking scale (1-120). Other leadership posts, which
include chairs of less important committees, also have significant effects in the range of 6-8
positions. The magnitude of these coefficients appears somewhat higher for Republicans, which
had minority status for most of the period, but the differences across parties are not statistically
significant.
Membership in the majority party also has a large, positive impact on Effectiveness. We
can estimate this even with individual fixed effects by exploiting the switches in majority party
control that occurred in 1994 and again in 1998. Republicans took control following the 1994
elections, and Democrats regained control after the 1998 elections. The coefficients show that
majority party status increases a legislator's ranking by 20 positions, a large jump. This is even
larger than the effect of becoming a chamber leader or powerful committee chair.14
This finding deserves special attention in view of the ongoing debate about whether and how
parties matter in U.S. politics. Rohde (1991), Aldrich (1995), Aldrich and Rohde (2000, 2001),
and others argue that members of the majority party in the U.S. Congress are advantaged
due to their ability to organize the chamber. Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2002) argue that the
majority party uses its power to control the legislative floor agenda. In contrast, Krehbiel (1993,
1998, 1999) and others argue that the majority party in Congress has little agenda control, and
that majority party status confers few policy-relevant benefits.
Our findings support the view that being in the majority party does matter.1 5 The large
effect of majority party status is especially interesting because North Carolina is not known as
a "strong party" state. Party affiliation may have an even larger impact in other states.
The random effects estimates indicate that lawyers are especially effective legislators. Weis-
sert (1991) found this previously. It is not surprising that lawyers are more effective, since
legislators make laws and lawyers have years of specialized training in the theory and applica-
tion of law, legal jargon, and so on.16 What is surprising is the magnitude of the effect - for
14The year coefficients for 1994 and 1996 are significantly different than the rest of coefficients in the nineties
for columns 3-6 - smaller for Democrats and larger for Republicans - indicating the presence of majority party
effects.
15 Ansolabehere and Snyder (1999) and Cox and Magar (1999) find that majority party status matters for
campaign contributions, which could be related to power.
16 An anonymous referee suggested that lawyers may be especially effective because they have experience in, and
an affinity for, the process of formalized dispute. In contrast, businessmen are accustomed to making unilateral,
executive decisions.
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example, being a lawyer appears to have a larger impact on Effectiveness than being the chair
of a powerful committee.
Previous service in the state legislature only appears to matter for Democrats. This may
be a consequence of the fact that Democrats had large majorities in both chambers until the
late 1980s and 1990s, giving them a larger pool of candidates with prior experience. The same
is true for the variable Age at Entry.
The first set of variables in Table 1 captures the effects of experience. The coefficients on
the Tenure variables are large and highly significant in all specifications. Legislators in their
second termra re on average 17 positions ahead of their freshmen counterparts, and legislators in
their fourth term are 30 positions ahead. Experience yields diminishing returns, and after five
terms additional experience has at best a small impact on effectiveness. Importantly, however,
we find no evidence that effectiveness eventually declines with tenure. Also, we never reject the
hypothesis that the Tenure coefficients are the same in both parties.
The results show the magnitude of experience effects is first order. For example, having one
term of experience is already more important than holding a powerful committee chair, and
slightly less than being in the majority party. In the next section we explore the source and
character of these experience effects.
Finally, Table 2 shows results for the NC state Senate, analogous to those of columns 1
and 2 in Table 1. The results are qualitatively similar to those for NC House. In particular,
Effectiveness rises sharply with tenure in the first few terms, even controlling for leadership
positions. WVe cannot confidently identify the effect of majority party status, however, because
the Senate was under Democratic control throughout the period. Note that it is misleading to
directly compare the coefficients in Tables and 2, because the chambers differ in size, and the
dependent variables have different scales (the range of Effectiveness is 1-120 in the House and
1-50 in the Senate).
3.5 Effectiveness and Tenure
The estimates in Table 1 show clearly that average relative performance in the legislature
increases with experience, even controlling for institutional leadership positions, majority party
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status, and other factors. This increase in effectiveness could reflect a real increase in legislative
abilities. Alternatively, the increase might simply reflect selective re-election and retirements. If
the electoral process is good at weeding out under-performing politicians and/or those who are
not effective retire earlier (perhaps because they do not enjoy the job), then average performance
could rise with seniority simply as a consequence of selection.
To isolate the effects of electoral selection and retirement, we estimate specifications similar
to those in Table 1, but restrict the sample to the set of legislators first elected between 1976
and 1994 who served four consecutive terms in the House of Representatives. Also, we only
include the observations on the first four terms served for each of these legislators. The result
is a balanced panel about which we can make more meaningful conditional statements.
Table 3 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the same specification of Table 1 using
the restricted sample. Again, we present random effects and fixed effects estimates. Columns
3 and 4 show fixed effects estimates for each party separately.
Looking first at columns 1 and 2, the estimates show clearly that conditional on serving at
least four terms in the legislature, a legislator's effectiveness rating increases with tenure, even
controlling for institutional positions. Average relative performance increases sharply between
the first period and the second, and again between the second period and the third; it increases
again, but more gradually, from the third period to the fourth. The coefficients from the random
effects model are close to those in Table 1. The coefficients from the fixed effects model imply
an even steeper profile. This indicates that the positive effect experience has on effectiveness is
not due primarily to electoral selection and selective retirements. Surviving legislators become
more effective with experience.
The coefficients on the committee leadership variables are somewhat smaller than in the
unrestricted sample, but the coefficient on Chamber Leader is larger. This might reflect the
fact that very few representatives obtain chamber leadership positions early in their legislative
career. The estimated effect of being a member of the majority party is similar to that in the
unrestricted sample.
The estimates in columns 3 and 4 suggest that tenure has a larger impact on Republicans
than Democrats, but the differences are not statistically significant.
Since the effect of experience on effectiveness is so large, we would like to know more
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about its nature. The literature on agency theory provides two main possibilities. The first is
learning-by-doing. Legislators might acquire important knowledge and skills simply by being
in the General Assembly - watching how other legislators write bills and push them through
the process, participating in committee hearings, mark-up sessions, and floor debates, and so
on. Another possibility is that the experience effect reflects costly investment decisions - extra
time and energy spent learning the legislative process that could be spent on other activities.
Which of these dominates matters for some policy decisions and questions of institutional
design. For example, our findings imply that term limits entail a large loss of legislative-specific
human capital, simply by reducing the experience of the average legislator. However, if the
human is acquired mainly through costly investments, then the loss due to term limits would
be greatly compounded by reducing legislators' incentives to make the required investments.
Another implication is that if legislative human capital is costly to acquire, then legislative lead-
ers, and voters, must provide positive incentives to induce legislators to make the investment.
This is less important if learning-by-doing is at work.
To assess these two hypotheses, we separate legislators into different groups that ex ante
should have different incentives to invest. The results of this are shown in Table 4. The
specifications presented in the table include individual fixed effects (random effects regressions
produce qualitatively similar results).
In column 1 we test whether legislators who are younger when they first enter the House
have steeper effectiveness-experience profiles (thus, Group = 1 for those with Age of Entry <
50, and Non-Group = for those with Age of Entry > 50. Younger legislators should expect
to have longer legislative careers, and may be more likely to consider the state House as a
stepping-stone in their political careers. If so, they have a greater incentive to invest, and
should have steeper effectiveness-experience profiles. As the coefficients and F-statistic in the
table show, however, we cannot reject that the profiles are the same for both groups.
Column 2 shows the results of another test. Here we compare the effectiveness-experience
profiles of Democrats and Republicans in the period up to 1992. This was a period of Demo-
cratic dominance. The returns to investing in legislative skills should be higher for members
of a dominant majority party, because ceteris paribus, their bills are more likely to pass. For
example, over the period 1983-1990, Democrats in the House introduced an average of 22.8
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bills per legislator, 7.6 of which were ratified; Republicans introduced 8.5 bills per legislator,
2.2 of which were ratified. Examining Table 4, the investment hypothesis again fares poorly.
The effectiveness-experience profiles of Democrats and Republicans look similar, and the F-test
does not reject the hypothesis that they are the same.
The tests above are not very strong, so we hesitate to draw strong conclusions. Tentatively,
however, the evidence suggests that most of the increase in performance that comes from
experience is due to learning-by-doing on the job.
Can we say anything about what legislators learn? In column 3, we test whether legislators
with previous legislative service have flatter effectiveness-tenure profiles than newcomers (thus,
Group = for those Previous Service = 1, and Non-Group = for those with Previous Service
= 0). This is in fact the case, and we can reject the hypothesis that there is no difference
between the groups at the 10% confidence level. Legislators with previous service begin with a
higher effectiveness ranking than those without previous service (see Table 1), but their ranking
grows more slowly with additional experience. The pattern is consistent with the hypothesis
that the newcomers are "catching up," learning things that those with previous service have
already learned. This suggests that at least part of what is learned is knowledge specific to the
General Assembly.
Column 4 shows yet another cut at the data. If the knowledge acquired in the legislature is
related purely to technical aspects of law-making - legal jargon, the structure of existing law,
etc. - then lawyers should begin with higher effectiveness rankings, but have flatter profiles,
because they already possess much of this knowledge. Table 1 shows that lawyers are more
effective, but column 4 of Table 4 shows that their effectiveness-experience profiles are just as
steep as those of non-lawyers. Lawyers are simply more effective legislators throughout their
careers. This suggests that legal technicalities are not at the core of what legislators learn with
experience.
Of course, there are many other possibilities. Legislators might aquire detailed knowledge
about particular policy areas - budgeting, taxation, transportation, education, health care,
social services, etc. - and how different policies interact; they might learn who is who and who
knows what in the executive branch; the preferences and personalities of other legislators and
how to bargain with them; who are potential partners in promoting different kinds of bills; and
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which staffers are more efficient and get the work done.
3.6 Allocating Positions of Power
In an efficient legislature, the most talented legislators should obtain important leadership
positions sooner than less talented individuals. An efficient legislature should also allocate
important positions on the basis of previous performance. How efficient is the North Carolina
House of Representatives in these terms?
To assess the first of these criteria, we need a measure of "talent." We use the effectiveness
rating a legislator receives in his or her first term. This is arguably a good measure of a member's
relative aptitude for legislative work, where aptitude is interpreted broadly to include skills,
drive, personality, and how much the member enjoys legislative tasks. As noted above, the
ranking is (lone at the end of the first "long session" in which a legislator serves, so legislators,
lobbyists and journalists have had some time to see the legislator at work. However, almost no
legislators hiold powerful positions in their first term, so the initial ratings are not influenced
by variations in institutional power.
We examine whether legislators with high initial effectiveness evaluations advance to power-
ful committee positions more quickly than other legislators. We focus on the dependent variable
Power Committee Leader, which is 1 for the chairs, vice-chairs and subcommittee chairs of the
five most powerful committees in each chamber. Since this is a dichotomous variable, we run
probit regressions. To control for seniority effects (as well as selection issues due to attrition),
we estimate models for legislators with the same amount of tenure. We consider three sub-
samples: legislators in their second term, those in their third term, and those in their fourth
term.
Table 5 presents the results. The first three columns show the effect of increased aptitude
on the probability of attaining a powerful committee position by a legislator's second, third or
fourth term. For legislators in their second and third terms, Effectiveness 1 has a significant
and positive effect. This effect does not appear in the fourth term, but the sample is small.
The estimated effects in the second and third terms are quite large. Consider the third term.
Holding all other variables at their mean values, an increase in Effectiveness 1 from one-half
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of a standard deviation below the mean to one-half of a standard deviation above the mean
(24 points, in the relevant sub-sample), increases the probability a legislator is promoted to a
powerful committee position from .22 to .31, a 50% increase. 17
In columns 4 and 5 we examine the effect of previous performance on the probability of
attaining a powerful committee position by a legislator's third or fourth term. The independent
variable of interest in these specifications is Lagged Effectiveness (the lag is one period). This
variable is statistically and substantively significant in both the third and fourth terms. For
example, legislators with higher effectiveness rankings in their second term are more likely to
be promoted to a powerful committee leadership positions in their third term. Interestingly,
columns 3 and 5 in the table imply that although the impact of Effectiveness 1 has faded by
the fourth term, recent effectiveness still matters for promotions.
Clearly, we also expect seniority to be strongly related to promotions. Table 6 shows the
relative importance of seniority and aptitude, where aptitude is again measured using Effec-
tiveness 1. We divide the sample into Low and High initial effectiveness categories, splitting
each cohort at the median. Looking across the columns of the table, we see that seniority has
a large influence on the probability a legislator attains a powerful committee position. Look-
ing down the rows, we see that initial effectiveness also matters. In particular, having a High
value of Effectiveness 1 increases a legislator's probability of promotion by an amount that is
approximately equal to one additional term of service.18
Overall, seniority dominates the internal promotion process. Since tenure is strongly related
to effectiveness, seniority rule might actually be a good way to allocate top committee and
party leadership posts. We can use our data to calculate the relative efficiency of different
promotion procedures 9 A completely random allocation of posts would produce a group of
17Separate analyses by party confirm the results in Table 5. For example, for legislators in their second term
the estimated coefficient on Effectiveness 1 is .016 for Democrats and .023 for Republicans. Both are statistically
significant at the .05 level.
18 The attrition rates shown in Table 6 exhibit an interesting pattern. Legislators with Low aptitude are almost
as likely to survive four terms in the legislature as those with High aptitude. However, a noticeably larger fraction
of the Low-aptitude legislators leave the legislature after only one term of service. This suggests that the nature
of the attrition processes is different for the two groups. For example, Low-aptitude legislators might tend to
lose elections or retire, and High-aptitude legislators might tend to seek higher offices, which are not offered to
inexperienced politicians.
19 For this exercise we include party leaders as well as committee leaders. That is, we consider all posts for
which Power Committee Leader = 1 or Chamber Leader = 1.
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powerful committee and party leaders with an average effectiveness ranking of 60.0. The first-
best allocation - i.e. allocating posts to the legislators with the highest "intrinsic effectiveness"
rankings - would produce an average effectiveness of 81.3.2° Strict adherence to seniority rule
would produce an average effectiveness of 72.4. In the data, the actual average effectiveness
ranking for committee and party leaders is 73.0. Thus, seniority rule is closer to the fully
efficient outcome than to the outcome under a random allocation. The chamber does even
better in practice - though not by much.
3.7 Effectiveness and Reelection
In this section we explore whether being a more effective representative yields electoral or other
career benefits.
The heavy use of first-past-the-post, multi-member districts in the North Carolina state
legislature complicates the study of electoral outcomes. In addition, many races are fully or
partially uncontested. Analyses with vote-share as the dependent variable must drop these
cases, and doing so is likely to introduce selection bias. We therefore focus on two other
electoral outcome variables: Reelected and Unopposed. We also present one tentative analysis
with total votes as the dependent variable. In addition, we study two "career" variables: Sought
Higher Office and Retired.2'
Tables contain the results for the electoral outcome variables.22 The first two columns
examine whether being effective helps in a reelection bid. In the first column the sample consists
of all NC House representatives who seek reelection. In the second column we restrict attention
to freshmen seeking reelection, to avoid potential selection bias. In both cases Effectiveness
has a strong, positive impact on reelection. Holding all other variables at their means, a one-
2 0To measure each legislator's "intrinsic effectiveness," we regress Effectiveness on all of the variables in column
1 of Table 1 other than the Tenure variables, and take the legislator-specific fixed effects. Note that while this
is a reasonable theoretical benchmark it is almost surely unattainable in practice.
2 1 It would be interesting to study the cases where a state representative runs against a state senator and we
have Effectiveness evaluations for both candidates, but there are too few such cases in our sample.
22 Three caveats must be mentioned. First, we do not have a good measure of challenger "quality," so there is
some danger of omitted variable bias. Second, incumbents may retire strategically in order to avoid a probable
defeat, leading to selection bias. Third, Effectiveness only refers to the legislative process, and ignores other
political activity such as casework (this likely leads to attenuation bias in our estimates). Previous analyses of
state legislative elections have ignored these issues, except possibly to note that they are potential problems (e.g.
Holbrook and Tidmarch, 1991; King, 1991; Cox and Morgenstern, 1993, 1995).
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standard-deviation increase in Effectiveness (34 positions) centered on the mean increases the
probability of reelection from 89% to 95%. This effect is magnified over the course of a career.
For example, it translates into a 16 percentage point increase in the probability of winning three
elections in a row, from 70% to 86%.23
As expected, Normal Vote has a strong effect as well. Most other variables are insignificant.
These findings are consistent with studies of congressional races, which typically find that
institutional positions have little independent effect on election outcomes. 2 4
In columns 3 and 4 we study the probability a legislator is unopposed. The results show
that higher Effectiveness significantly decreases the chances a legislator is challenged. 25 Using
the coefficients from column 3, a one-standard-deviation increase in Effectiveness centered at
the mean reduces the probability of being challenged by 10 percentage points, from 67% to 57%.
As expected, Normal Vote also has an important impact on contestation, because it reduces
the chances that a challenge is successful.
We can exploit multi-member districts to study the impact of Effectiveness on total votes, at
least for a subset of cases. This is shown in the last column in Table 7. We pool all multi-member
districts in the sample, and regress the total votes received by each incumbent on Effectiveness
and Tenure. We control for all other characteristics of a race by including a fixed effect for
each party in each district in each year. Thus, we compare the votes of equally experienced
incumbents from the same party who are running against one another in the same district in
the same year. The estimates imply that a one-standard deviation increase in Effectiveness (34
positions) increases an incumbent's expected vote by about 500 votes. This represents 2% of
the average vote received, or about one-third of the median incumbency advantage estimated
for state legislators nationwide. 2 6
Legislative effectiveness might have a larger impact on elections in North Carolina than
in other states, precisely because a respected set of rankings exists. In North Carolina, the
rankings are even used in campaign advertising. 2 7 This might explain why our findings differ
23 In the case of freshmen, the probability of reelection increases from 82% to 87%, and the probability of
winning three consecutive terms increases from 55% to 66%. Our findings are similar to Luttbeg (1992).
2 4 See, e.g. Bullock (1972) and Fowler, Douglass, and Clark (1980).
25This is consistent with Mondak (1995c).
26 See King (1991) and Cox and Morgenstern (1993,1995).
27 Informing citizens about their representatives' performance is, in fact, a goal of the NC Center.
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from those of other scholars, such as Wawro (2000) who finds that bill sponsorship in the U.S.
House is unrelated to reelection.
Table 8 examines the relationship between Effectiveness and career decisions taken by leg-
islators. Columns and 2 examine the decision to retire from politics. Higher Effectiveness
appears to reduce the propensity to retire for the whole sample, but not for freshmen.28 Inter-
estingly, Age is not a good predictor of retirement, but Tenure is.29
A similar picture arises in columns 3 and 4 where we examine the impact of Effectiveness on
the decision to run for a higher office (whether the bid is successful or not). The results show
that this effect is significant for the whole sample, but not for freshman. This points to another
benefit of being an effective legislator: access to higher positions for those with progressive
ambition. Overall, this set of results suggests that more effective legislators retire less often and
seek higher office with higher probability.
3.8 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we study an under-utilized source of data on legislative effectiveness. The data
can be used to measure both the performance and aptitude of legislators. Our analysis reveals
several interesting patterns. First, legislators' effectiveness increase sharply during the first few
terms of service. This finding is quite robust, and holds even after controlling for institutional
positions and electoral selection. The increasing performance appears to be due mainly to
learning-by-doing rather than costly investment in specific skills. Second, belonging to the
majority party in the legislature increases legislator's performance over and above access to
more powerful positions (at least in the NC House of Representatives). Third, the NC House
appears to use both past performance and seniority as criteria for allocating positions of power;
but, since performance increases with tenure, the system behaves closely to one governed by a
pure seniority rule. Fourth, superior effectiveness yields electoral benefits in the form of higher
reelection rates and a higher probability of being unchallenged. Also, more effective legislators
tend to seek higher offices more often, and retire less quickly.
28We hesitate to give a causal interepretation of this coefficient, because legislators who are planning to retire
may shirk.
29 This is consistent with Kiewiet and Zeng (1993).
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These findings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency
advantage, and seniority rule.
We make three comments on term limits. First, the fact that elections tend to oust ineffective
legislators more often than effective ones means that term limits may not be necessary as a
mechanism for weeding out under-performing legislators, at least in North Carolina.30 Second,
the fact that legislative effectiveness increases sharply during the first few terms of the typical
legislator's career means that term limits might impose substantial costs in the form of lost
capability and expertise. We cannot estimate the magnitude of the loss because our data are
only ordinal. However, a simple calculation suggests that the losses are not trivial. On average,
about 29% of the representatives in North Carolina are serving their 5th or higher term. If a
term limit of four terms implied that all of these members would be replaced with freshmen, then
the NC House would lose nearly 50% of its "person-years" of effective experience. 3 1 Third, the
fact that high-skilled legislators are more likely to attain powerful positions on key committees
and inside party leaderships further increases the costs of term limits. The key committees have
jurisdiction over crucial policies - the tax code, state spending priorities, constitutional issues
- where poor decisions and poorly written laws are likely to impose especially high social costs.
It is therefore important to fill these positions with highly competent legislators, and having
found such legislators it is costly to remove them via term limits.
Of course, our findings do not establish that term limits would do more harm than good. A
thorough analysis must go much further in quantifying the costs, and must then balance these
costs against the potential benefits, such as the possibility that long periods of service lead
legislators to adopt an inside-the-capitol view of public policies that does not reflect the views
of their constituents.
The fact that effectiveness rises with tenure may help account for the incumbency advantage
in legislative elections. If voters care about their legislator's effectiveness, then there will be
30See Mondak (1995a, 1995b) and Petracca (1995) for a discussion of the potential effects of term limits on
average quality of the legislature.
31The calculation is as follows: On average, 23% of all representatives are freshmen, 20% are sophomores, 16%
are in their 3rd term, 12% are in their 4th term, and 29% are in their 5th or higher term. Assign "years of
effective experience" as follows: freshmen = 0, sophomores = 1, 3rd term = 2, 4th term or higher = 3. Then
the average number of "years of effective experience" in the NC House is 208.6. Turning all those with 5+ terms
into freshmen would reduce this to 105.3, a drop of 49.5%. Gilmour and Rothstein (1994) analyze this effect of
term limits.
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an electoral bias in favor of incumbents that is due simply to their accumulated experience.
The fact that effectiveness increases steeply with experience during the first few terms but
then levels-off is also broadly similar to the patterns observed in estimates of the incumbency
advantage over legislators' careers. For example, Hibbing (1991) and Ansolabehere et al. (2000)
find that in the U.S. House the typical incumbent's vote grows quickly over the first few election
cycles but then hits a plateau.
Our results help evaluate the costs and benefits of seniority rule. A system that promotes
legislators to powerful positions purely on the basis of seniority is almost surely sub-optimal,
because legislators have different skills and preferences for legislative work. As our calculations
suggest, however, since effectiveness grows with experience, it is reasonably efficient to use
seniority as the main criterion for promotion.
Our results also reveal an important omission in the theoretical literature on electoral ac-
countability and selection. This large and growing body of work models the interactions between
voters and politicians as a principal-agent relationship, focusing on the ability of voters to hold
politicians accountable and/or choose "good" politicians.3 2 None of the existing models incor-
porate learning-by-doing by politicians. Some of these models, such as Banks and Sundaram
(1993), even predict that performance will diminish over politician's career. Our findings sug-
gest that the reduction in effort associated with the logic of career concerns is more than offset
by learning how to do legislative work, resulting in increasing performance over time.
Finally, there is much more to learn using the NC Center's data. We find that prior per-
formance helps legislators attain positions of power, but what about other factor such as party
loyalty? Cox and McCubbins (1993) and others argue that party leaders in the U.S. House
allocate committee chairs and other powerful positions to those who vote along party lines. Is
this true for the NC House? More interestingly, what is the relative importance of loyalty and
effectiveness? Many other questions come to mind as well. Are ideologically moderate legisla-
tors, who may be better positioned to forge legislative coalitions, more effective? Are lobbyists'
evaluations more closely related to campaign donations from special interests? Are journalists'
evaluations more reflective of the "public interest"? Are more effective legislators better at
bringing home the bacon? Do multi-member districts lead to less accountability and thereby
32See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000), Chapter 4, and the cites therein.
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less effectiveness? What about marginal vs. safe districts? Does the lack of competition in
the general election produce legislators that are less effective? Or are primaries just as good
at weeding out ineffective politicians? Work that merges the effectiveness ratings with other
data - roll calls, campaign contributions, and state government spending - should generate
interesting insights about internal legislative politics, electoral accountability, and selection.
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Appendix Table A.1: Variable Definitions
Variable
Effectiveness
Effectiveness 1
Power Committee Chair
Power Committee Vice Chair
Power Committee Leader
Number of Power Committees
Other Committee Chair
Other Committee Vice Chair
Chamber Leader
Democrat
Majority Party
Lawyer
Previous Service
Age
Age at Entry
Tenure
Tenure 1, Tenure 2, etc.
Tenure 5+
Normal Vote
Uncontested
Reelected
Sought Higher Office
Retired
Definition
inverse of effectiveness rank; = 120 for the top-ranked house
member, and 1 for lowest-ranked member
legislator's Effectiveness at the end of his or her first term
1 if legislator is chair or co-chair of one of 5 most powerful
committees
1 if legislator is vice chair or ranking member of one of 5 most
powerful committees, or chair of Appropriations subcommittee
Max(Chair of Power Committee, Vice Chair of Power Committee)
number of Power committees on which a legislator serves
1 if legislator is chair of a committee that is not one of 5 most
powerful committees
1 if legislator is vice chair or ranking member of a committee that
is not one of 5 most powerful committees
1 if legislator is Speaker of the House, President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Deputy Speaker,
Deputy President Pro Tem., Majority Whip, or Minority Whip
1 if legislator is a Democrat
1 if legislator is member of majority party
1 if legislator is a lawyer
1 if legislator has served previously in the NC General Assembly,
and service ended 3 or more years before beginning of current
term
legislator's age
legislator's age in freshman year
number of terms legislator has served in chamber including current
term
1 if legislator is in his or her first term (a freshman), 1 if legislator
is in his or her second term, etc.
1 if legislator is in his or her fifth or higher term
normal vote measures using election for statewide offices; see text
1 if legislator seeks reelection and is uncontested
1 if legislator seeks reelection and wins
1 if legislator seeks higher office (state senate, statewide office, or
Congress, including appointed positions)
1 if legislator retired from politics
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Appendix Table A.2: Summary Statistics
V a be....... .......... ............. ................. .................................................... 
Variable
Effectiveness
Effectiveness 1
Power Committee Chair
Power Committee Vice Chair
Power Committee Leader
Number of Power Committees
Other Committee Chair
Other Committee Vice Chair
Chamber Leader
Democrat
Majority Party
Lawyer
Previous Service
Age
Age at Entry
Tenure
Tenure 1
Tenure 2
Tenure 3
Tenure 4
Tenure 5+
Normal Vote, 1976-1980
Normal Vote, 1982-1990
Normal Vote, 1992-2000
Reelected
Uncontested
Sought Higher Office
Retired
Mean
61.0
34.5
.06
.20
.24
1.55
.25
.27
.04
.67
.68
.18
.09
54.0
48.5
3.67
.23
.20
.16
.12
.29
.54
.57
.59
.89
.39
.05
.10
t. .....D...... 
St Dev
34.4
24.3
.24
.40
.43
.72
.44
.44
.20
.47
.47
.39
.29
12.2
11.2
2.78
.42
.40
.37
.32
.45
.06
.09
.09
.30
.49
.22
.30
Min
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
24
24
0
0
0
0
0
.42
.38
.40
0
0
0
0
Max
120
116
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
90
73
19
1
1
1
1
1
.75
.78
.83
1
1
1
1
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Table 1: Determinants of Average Effectiveness, 1977-2002
-. - . ... ...... ... -.. ... . - - .. . - -- ..... _ ..
Dep. Var. =
Effectiveness
Tenure 2
Tenure 3
Tenure 4
Tenure 5
Power Committee
Chair
Power Committee
Vice Chair
Other Committee
Chair
Other Committee
Vice Chair
Chamber Leader
Majority Party
Lawyer
Previous Service
Age at Entry
N
Hausman test statistic
P-value
FE
All Reps.
17.33* *
(1.32)
25.50* *
(1.65)
29.75**
(1.95)
33.03**
(2.47)
14.05* *
(1.86)
8.45**
(1.16)
8.11**
(1.35)
2.50*
(1.14)
12.74* *
(2.22)
21.06* *
(1.33)
1,540
RE
All Reps.
17.73* *
(1.24)
25.83**
(1.44)
30.49**
(1.60)
34.42**
(1.64)
16.29* *
(1.82)
9.26**
(1.12)
8.32**
(1.31)
1.98
(1.10)
16.06* *
(2.19)
20.88**
(1.24)
20.09* *
(2.49)
7.61*
(3.46)
-.454**
(.086)
1,540
354.7
.000
'--' ...... ''-'"- --'''-'
FE
Democs.
19.22* *
(1.75)
25.79**
(2.14)
30.75**
(2.41)
35.01* 
(2.90)
12.99* 
(2.05)
6.75**
(1.27)
7:29* *
(1.66)
2.09
(1.46)
11.09* *
(2.65)
1,039
............... ---
RE
Democs.
18.50* *
(1.63)
24.68* *
(1.89)
29.96* *
(2.02)
34.06* *
(2.00)
15.47* *
(2.00)
7.68**
(1.23)
8.22**
(1.59)
2.27
(1.39)
12.29* *
(2.63)
18.79* *
(2.71)
18.73* 
(4.74)
-. 603**
(.101)
1,039
164.7
.000
FE
Repubs.
17.47* *
(2.35)
26.02**
(2.89)
29.81* *
(3.66)
31.06* 
(4.92)
17.23* 
(4.05)
12.28* *
(2.63)
7.08*
(2.98)
.22
(2.25)
19.58* 
(3.95)
501
_ .... _. .... __........
RE
Repubs.
19.13* 
(2.22)
28.14* *
(2.48)
32.44* *
(2.99)
36.86**
(3.31)
19.74* *
(4.03)
13.30* *
(2.58)
6.52*
(2.97)
-1.21
(2.20)
22.63**
(3.88)
19.36* 
(5.92)
.666
(5.32)
-.273
(.158)
501
81.3
.000
Standard errors in parentheses; ** = significant at the .01 level; * = significant at the .05
level.
All specifications include year fixed effects.
The excluded tenure category is Tenure 1, so the Tenure coefficients represent
differences with respect to the valuation of freshmen.
The Hausman test statistics (columns 2, 4 and 6) are for hypothesis that the individual
effects are orthogonal to the regressors.
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Table 2: Determinants of Average Effectiveness NC
Senate, 1977-2002
Dep. Var. = Effectiveness
Tenure 2
Tenure 3
Tenure 4
Tenure 5
Power Committee Chair
Power Committee Vice Chair
Other Committee Chair
Other Committee Vice Chair
Chamber Leader
Majority Party
Lawyer
Previous Service
Age at Entry
N
FE All
Reps.
8.36**
(0.76)
12.75* *
(0.95)
15.09* *
(1.19)
18.04* *
(1.59)
5.36**
(1.14)
2.39**
(0.65)
-0.17
(0.99)
-1.39
(0.82)
1.56
(0.99)
636
RE All
Reps.
7.58**
(0.74)
11.65**
(0.86)
13.59* *
(1.01)
16.37* *
(1.10)
7.68**
(1.13)
3.08**
(0.64)
1.98**
(0.96)
-0.49
(0.81)
2.63*
(1.01)
7.32**
(1.53)
3.06*
(1.49)
0.02
(0.07)
636
Standard errors in parentheses; ** = significant at the .01 level; * = significant at the .05
leveL
All specifications include year fixed effects.
The excluded tenure category is Tenure 1, so the Tenure coefficients represent
differences with respect to the valuation of freshmen.
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Table 3: Survivor Analyses to Estimate Experience Effects, 1977-2002
Dep. Var. = Effectiveness
Tenure 2
Tenure 3
Tenure 4
Power Committee Chair
Power Committee Vice Chair
Other Committee Chair
Other Committee Vice Chair
Chamber Leader
Majority Party
Lawyer
Previous Service
Age at Entry
N
Hausman test statistic
P-value
Standard errors in parentheses;
level.
** = significant at the .01 level; * = significant at the .05
Sample restricted to the first four terms of all legislators first elected between 1976 and
1994 who served four consecutive terms in the same chamber.
All specifications include year fixed effects.
The excluded tenure category is Tenure 1, so the Tenure coefficients represent
differences with respect to the valuation of freshmen.
The Tenure coefficients are not significantly different between columns 3 and 4, so there
is little evidence of differential experience effects across parties.
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FE
All Reps.
20.72**
(4.02)
31.86**
(7.41)
39.44**
(10.78)
13.10**
(3.89)
8.89**
(1.85)
9.84**
(2.07)
2.53
(1.68)
19.12**
(3.92)
21.36**
(2.00)
582
FE
Democrats
16.75**
(5.25)
22.84* *
(9.56)
26.44* *
(13.85)
10.56*
(5.24)
8.18**
(2.22)
11.48**
(2.71)
4.87*
(2.30)
11.06*
(5.62)
351
RE
All Reps.
17.19**
(1.83)
24.88**
(2.22)
29.43 * *
(2.54)
16.41*
(3.79)
10.44* *
(1.81)
10.22**
(2.04)
2.56
(1.66)
20.62* *
(3.79)
21.38**
(1.91)
18.75* 
(4.45)
5.74
(4.73)
-.560**
(0.15)
582
72.25
.000
FE
Republicans
22.76* *
(6.86)
35.98**
(12.36)
44.70* *
(18.05)
10.80
(6.64)
8.13*
(3.90)
4.59
(4.45)
-1.71
(3.18)
26.54* *
(6.01)
231
Table 4: Testing Hypothesis on Experience Effects, 1977-2002
Dep. Variable = Effectiveness Model and Sample
Sample: 1977-2001 1977-1993 1977-2001 1977-2001
Group tested: Age at Entry <50 Democrats Previous Service Lawyers
22.02* * 15.26* 13.53* 20.86**
Tenure 2 ~-~Group (4.28) (5.69) (6.02) (5.51)
18.52* * 10.34 20.53** 20.75 *
Tenure 2-Non-Group (4.38) (6.45) (4.01) (4.06)
32.16* * 25.04* 20.2* 26.73 *
Tenure 3 -Group ~(7.45) (10.09) (8.79) (8.36)
29.24* * 20.22 31.09* 32.83* *
Tenure 3 -Non-Group (7.82) (10.59) (7.40) (7.44)
39.56* * 30.83* 26.42* 37.06**
Tenure 4 -~Group (10.85) (14.45) (12.02) (11.33)
35.56* * 28.68 37.74* * 40.11 * *
Tenure 4 -Non-Group (11.18) (15.03) (10.75) (10.82)
12.66** 15.13** 12.98** 14.14**
Power Committee Chair (3.93) (5.67) (3.89) (3.96)
8.72** 10.79** 8.41** 9.02**
Power Committee Vice Chair (1.86) (2.42) (1.85) (1.87)
9.56** 15.75** 8.92** 10.17 *
Other Committee hair (2.08) (3.09) (2.09) (2.10)
2.31 9.33** 2.23 2.64Other Committee Vice Chair23193*22326Other Comittee Vice Chair (1.69) (2.47) (1.68) (1.69)
19.12** 40.03** 20.24** 20.44**
Chamber Leader ~(3.93) (5.56) (3.93) (4.01)
21.48* * 21.57** 21.21 **
Majority Party (2.00) (2.00) (2.03)
N 582 304 582 582
F test statistic 0.68 0.52 2.36 0.93
P-value 0.56 0.67 0.07 0.43
Standard errors in parentheses; **
level.
= significant at the .01 level; * = significant at the .05
All specifications include year fixed effects and individual fixed effects.
Sample restricted to the first four terms of all legislators elected between 1976 and 1994
who served four consecutive terms in the same chamber.
The excluded tenure category is Tenure 1, so the Tenure coefficients represent
differences with respect to the valuation of freshmen.
The F test statistic is for the joint test of equality of the Tenure coefficients across groups.
130
Standard errors in parentheses; ** = significant at the .01 level; * = significant at the .05
level
Year effects are included in all specifications.
All colunms show probit regression coefficients.
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Table 5: Advancement to Powerful Positions in the House, 1977-2002
Dep. Var. =Power
Committee L aderICommittee Leader Tenure=2 Tenure=3 Tenure=4 Tenure=3 Tenure=4
Effectiveness .018** .011* .003
(.005) (.005) (.007)
Power Committee When .327 -.105 .283
Freshman (.192) (.204) (.278)
Effectiveness Lagged .012** .011*
(.004) (.005)
Committee Leader Lagged _ .539 1.25**
(.316) (.309)
Majority Party 1.33** 1.34** 4.61** 4.43** 6.93**
(.324) (.292) (.689) (.757) (.693)
Majority Party Lagged _ - 4.00** -3.01**
(.783) (.634)
Democrat -. 740* -. 531 -2.88** -. 325 -2.53**
(.343) (.301) (.736) (.325) (.724)
N 270 199 146 227 176
Sample includes all legislators for which Effectiveness is observed. The first number in
each cell gives the fraction of legislators in that category that hold a powerful position.
The second number is the standard error, reported in parentheses. The third number is the
frequency of that category.
The t-statistic is for a one-sided test ofthe hypothesis of no difference between legislators
with High and Low values of Effectiveness 1.
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Table 6: Ability vs. Seniority in the Advancement to
Powerful Positions in the House, 1977-2002
Terms in Office
Effectiveness 1 1 2 3 4
.017 .101 .244 .313
Low (.131) (.303) (.432) (.467)
173 118 90 67
.081 .270 .364 .366
High (.274) (.446) (.483) (.485)
172 137 99 71
t-statistic 3.57 1.78 .651
p-value .00 .038 .258
Table 7: Effectiveness and Electoral Outcomes, 1978-2000
Standard errors in parentheses; ** = significant at the .01 level; * = significant at the .05
level. Sample is restricted to representatives seeking reelection to the NC House of
Representatives.
Columns -4 show probit regression coefficients.
Column 5 is a linear regression, and includes year X district X party fixed effects.
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De Var.= j Reelected Reelected Unopposed Unopposed Votes
Dep. Var.= All Reps. Freshmen All Reps. Freshmen MMDs
Effectiveness .013** .010* .008** .014** 16.51**
(.002) (.004) (.001) (.004) (3.97)
Age -.004 -.011 .003 .001 -7.51
(.005) (.008) (.004) (.008) (8.36)
Majority P'arty -.521** -.371 .004 -.126 -
(.147) (.219) (.103) (.196)
Power Committee Chair -. 109 -.118 -118.87
(.316) (.189) (400.78)
Power Committee Vice Chair -.252 -.002 -.150 -.429 -148.22
(.153) (.498) (.112) (.474) (238.65)
Tenure .012 -.039 56.95
(.027) (.020) (45.19)
Year .027 .003 .002 .001
(.019) (.034) (.015) (.033)
Normal Vote, 1976-1980 5.79** 5.83** 5.98** 6.22** 
(.896) (1.54) (.567) (1.43)
Normal Vote, 1982-1990 4.99** 4.38** 7.04** 7.55**
(.727) (1.12) (.542) (1.11)
Normal Vote, 1992-2000 4.42** 4.59** 6.70** 7.11** I
(.720) (1.12) (.531) (1.05)
N 1,100 284 1,095 280 623
Standard errors in parentheses; **= significant at the .01 level; * = significant at the .05
level
All columns show probit regression coefficients.
Higher Office denotes representatives who sought election for a higher office or accepted
an appointment to a higher office.
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Table 8: Effectiveness and CareerDecisions, 1978-2000
:.Var. Retired Retired Higher Office Higher Office
~~~~ep. -All Reps. Freshmen All Reps. Freshmen
Effectiveness -. 005* -.015 .006* .002
(.002) (.009) (.003) (.007)
Age -.006 -. 029* -. 019** -.011
(.005) (.014) (.007) (.014)
Majority Party -.116 -.214 -.309 .198
(.146) (.399) (.192) (.389)
Power Committee Chair .421 .176
(.228) (.305)
Power Committee Vice Chair .267 1.22 -.079 .899
(.149) (.663) (.213) (.525)
Tenure .098** -.031
(.023) (.041)
Year .054 .119 .042 .033
(.023) (.083) (.029) (.093)
Normal Vote, 1976-1980 2.59* 6.23* -.189
(.851) (2.94) (1.23)
Normal Vote, 1982-1990 .669 1.98 -.695 .331
(.717) (2.33) (.974) (1.93)
Normal Vote,1992-2000 -.358 .746 -1.65 -.313
(.753) (2.38) (1.01) (1.82)
N 1,217 299 1,149 261
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